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Articles
Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers:
The ABCs of Future Public Payments Law
Mark Edwin Burge*
As technology rolls out ongoing and competing streams of payments innovation,
exemplified by Apple Pay (mobile payments) and Bitcoin (cryptocurrency), the law
governing these payments appears hopelessly behind the curve. The patchwork of state,
federal, and private legal rules seems more worthy of condemnation than emulation. This
Article argues, however, that the legal and market developments of the last several
decades in payment systems provide compelling evidence of the most realistic and socially
beneficial future for payments law. The paradigm of a comprehensive public law
regulatory scheme for payment systemsexemplified by Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform
Commercial Codehas faded in relevance, while federal law has grown in a specialized
consumer protection role. Meanwhile, private contract law has expanded to fill gaps
where payment technology has exceeded the scope of public law.
The evidence of the successes and failures of payments law in the face of rapid
technological development shows that the field is not best governed by comprehensive
public regulation on the Uniform Commercial Code model, but that public law still has
an importantalbeit narrowerrole for the future. The most beneficial paradigm for
governance of payment systems is a division between (1) private law handling systemic
matters of operation, and (2) public law focused on protecting payment system end-users
from oppression, fraud, and mistake. This demarcation of lawmaking responsibilities has
the greatest track record of success and is the most capable of dealing with a foreseeable
future of unforeseeable innovations.

* Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Both this Article and its
Author have benefitted greatly from Connell Alsup, Dan Barnhizer, Bryan Camp, Catherine
Christopher, Erin Fonté, Bill Henning, Sally Henry, Julie Hill, Sarah Jane Hughes, Jason Korosec,
Fred Miller, Peter Van Valkenburgh, Angela Walch, and Jane Winn for topical conversations,
comments on sundry drafts, orin some instancesboth. Particular thanks go to Dean Andrew
Morriss, Associate Dean for Faculty Research Huyen Pham, and Texas A&M University School of
Law for providing substantial institutional support to the eclectic stream of research from which
sprang this Article. Notwithstanding those debts of gratitude, however, the opinions expressed in this
Article are entirely the responsibility of the Author.
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Introduction
A half-century ago, checks held an overwhelmingly dominant role in
1
facilitating payments without cash. As recently as a decade ago, the
status quo for an end-user making noncash payments in the United
States could be summarized in two statements: (1) “No personal checks,
2
please;” and (2) “Will that be debit or credit?” Paper checks were still
important, but clearly in decline, and payment-by-plastic was ascendant
in its chocolate-or-vanilla flavors. The world of cashless payments today
is not so easily categorized. Mobile payment platforms like Apple Pay,
3
Android Pay, and Samsung Pay seek to displace physical wallets.

1. See, e.g., Personal Money Orders and Teller’s Checks: Mavericks Under the UCC, 85 Banking
L.J. 95, 95 (1968) (asserting “the emergence of the personal check as the standard means for paying
debts” in the post-World War II era).
2. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373, 1373 (2004) (finding in
the mid-2000s that “[c]redit cards present a significant socio-economic phenomenon.”); see also Mary
Elizabeth Matthews, Credit CardsAuthorized and Unauthorized Use, 13 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 233,
233 (1994) (observing in the mid-1990s that the “use of credit cards has expanded so rapidly in the last
few decades as to resemble a ‘plastic revolution.’”).
3. See, e.g., Erin F. Fonté, Mobile Payments in the United States: How Disintermediation May
Affect Delivery of Payment Functions, Financial Inclusion and Anti-Money Laundering Issues, 8 Wash.
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Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin seek to use digital tokens that not only
displace cash, but also displace the role of banks and other financial
institutions whose systems were once thought indispensable to noncash
4
transactions. It is no exaggeration to say that the Internet and its
associated technologies have changedand are continuing to
changeeverything in the realm of payments. So, what is the most
beneficial legal framework to deal with a foreseeable evolution of
payments in the future? This Article seeks, and finds, an answer to that
question out of both the successes and the wreckage of the past century
of payments law.
Payments law stands at an unusual juncture. One can rarely say that
a field exists with “no law,” as the common law jurisprudential system
prevents even the most exotic and unexpected developments from
occurring in a legal vacuum. Payments law is no exception herecourts,
regulators, and the general law of contracts will ultimately fill in legal
gaps where they must, perhaps by analogizing to or stretching a previous
generation of established law. A place where payments law is arguably
special is in its current existence as a devolved patchwork of rules that
have sprung up in place of a tightly planned comprehensive regime.
Electronic payments now permeate business and commerce. The
uninformed might accordingly think the signature legislative
achievement in the field of commercial lawthe Uniform Commercial
Code (“UCC”)would comprehensively address developing electronic
payments, but as observers of the UCC know, it does not. The highwater mark of the 1960s-era, state legislative enactments of UCC Articles
3 and 4 created comprehensive governance in the field of commercial
5
paper, including checks. This enactment has largely been followed by
decades of declining significance, as private law has grown to dominate
more recent payment technologies.
Public law has grown in one particular area of payments, that of
consumer protection, largely at the federal level, where the Truth in

J.L. Tech. & Arts 419, 421 (2013) (“Mobile payments technology is poised to create a globally
dramatic shift in how individuals pay for goods and services, track spending, and manage personal
finances.”); M. MacRae Robinson, Note, Easing the Burden on Mobile Payments: Resolving Current
Deficiencies in Money Transmitter Regulation, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 553, 553 (2014) (“The use of
mobile payment systems is rapidly expanding both at home and abroad, replacing traditional forms of
payment.”).
4. See, e.g., Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82
U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 53, 55 (2015) (“[C]ryptocurrencies are essentially protocols that allow for
the validation of transactions without the need for a trusted third party such as a bank, credit card
company, escrow agent, or recording agency.”).
5. See generally Henry Gabriel, The Revision of the Uniform Commercial CodeHow Successful
Has It Been?, 52 Hastings L.J. 653, 654–55 (2001); Mark Edwin Burge, Too Clever by Half: Reflections
on Perception, Legitimacy, and Choice of Law Under Revised Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 6 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 357, 360–61 (2015) (describing breadth of the original enactment of,
and revisions to, the UCC generally).
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Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act
(“EFTA”) represent a different approach to payments regulation. These
statutes eschew overarching codes in favor of targeted protections, such
6
7
as the fifty dollar liability limit for credit cards and debit cards. The
impact of this consumer-protective regime that facially imposes costs on
the issuance of payment cards has been phenomenal growth for the
8
industry. Consistent limitation of liability for fraudulent and erroneous
card transactions has created an atmosphere in which payment cards are
trusted more than they are feared. The cards accordingly have been
empowered to displace inefficient paper checks in consumer practices.
No card issuer could, by shifting fraud liability to its customers, harm
other card issuers by inspiring fear and reticence in the marketplace, and
the payment card system prospered as a result. The success of TILA and
EFTA thus stands as a successful model for targeted end-user protection,
and must be accounted for in mapping a future for payments law.
Private contract law, in contrast, dominates the operational side of
newer payment systems. Apart from TILA and EFTA, payment cards
function through a web of private contracts, stretching from user to
merchant with the card network in between. Increasing numbers of
payments without card networks occur through banks via the automated
clearing house (“ACH”) system. Collective self-governance through the
9
National Automated Clearing House Association (“NACHA”) and its
10
regional affiliates is a model of private law operated as a public-private
partnership. The private rules of NACHA, in cooperation with the quasipublic Federal Reserve System, have created a highly successful system
of payments that, like payment cards before it, are also rapidly displacing
11
checks. Every time a user receives a direct deposit paycheck or chooses
to use online bill payment services through a bank, an ACH transaction
has supplanted a check. Private law has been a tremendous success for
electronic payment systems in handling the operational side of payments
absent a comprehensive regulatory regime. If history is to hold any
lessons for the future of payments, the legal paradigm must include a
prominent place for private law.
Payment systems now stand in an era where technological innovation
in operations exceeds the regulatory capacity of public legal institutions.

6. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (West 2016).
7. See Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a)(1) (West 2016).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 62–67; Fed. Reserve Sys., The 2013 Federal Reserve
Payments Study: Recent and Long-Term Trends in the United States: 2000–2012 (2014).
9. See generally About NACHA, NACHA, The Elec. Payments Ass’n, https://www.nacha.org/
about (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (describing NACHA’s role in the payments industry).
10. See generally Regional Payments Associations, NACHA, The Elec. Payments Ass’n, https://
www.nacha.org/members/regional-payments-associations (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (providing guidance
on how to join Regional Payments Associations).
11. Se infra text accompanying notes 145–150.
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Public law protection of the end-user has nevertheless proven so successful
12
and facilitated such industry growth that complete privatization of
payments law is not the best response either. Legal inaction is not an
attractive option as innovation is stretching the capacity of public law to
function in areas of proven success. This Article argues that emerging
payment systems should be subject to a division between private law and
public law in which private law is predominant, but not exclusive.
Part I of this Article considers the role of Articles 3 and 4 of the
UCC as the ultimate regulatory embodiment of the common law of
13
noncash payments, particularly in the checking system. Part II then
establishes how the UCC’s high-water mark of comprehensive public
regulation has eroded over a several-decade period coinciding with the
rise of payment card networks and the ACH system. Both of these
systems are predominantlybut not exclusivelygoverned by private
contract law. This growth of private-law governance of payments has
14
coincided with a general marginalization of the original UCC regime.
With this background established, Part III of this Article then
considers two major strands of current innovation in payment systems:
15
mobile payments and cryptocurrency. The Apple Pay exemplar of
mobile payments illustrates the legal challenges arising from integration
of a new payment system into a pre-existing public law framework that
did not contemplate it. The Bitcoin exemplar of cryptocurrency shows a
very different challenge for payments law, the establishment of a system
that completely bypasses the previously unavoidable role of the banking
system as the trusted intermediary for noncash payments. Part IV
integrates lessons drawn from both payment systems history and recent
developments to suggest a governing framework in which public law and
private law are divided in a manner to maximize the overall socially16
beneficial effects. The Article concludes that the paradigm for
governance of payment systems going forward should be a division
between: (1) private law and public-private partnerships that handle
systemic matters of operation; and (2) public law focused on protecting
payment system end-users from oppression, fraud, and mistake. This
general demarcation of lawmaking responsibilities has the greatest track
record of success and is most capable of dealing with a foreseeable future
of payments that is filled with unforeseeable innovations.

12. See Lewis Mandell, The Credit Card Industry: A History 69 (1990) (observing that by the
end of the 1970s, a “wide array of laws and regulations” that protected consumers served the function
of “stabilizing the industry,” priming it for subsequent growth).
13. See infra Part I and text accompanying notes 17–60.
14. See infra Part II and text accompanying notes 62–184.
15. See infra Part III and text accompanying notes 185–244.
16. See infra Part IV and text accompanying notes 245–278.
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I. The Uniform Commercial Code as the Payments Law Paradigm
The weed-strewn landscape of payments law overall cannot be
explained without reference to the comparatively manicured lawn
occupied by Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC. Yet, as critics of the payment
articles frequently note, this portion of the UCC was hardly innovative,
arising as it did from a musty law of negotiable instruments dating back
17
to Lord Mansfield’s day. The payment articles cannot even claim to be
the first major attempt at codification of the common law of bills and
notes, having been preceded by the turn-of-the-century Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law. In a sense, the UCC payment articles
represent not only themselves, but centuries of history. As a result, any
understanding of the challenges to current payments law must include at
least a thumbnail sketch of its foundations.
Although the need for payments in commerce is as old as commerce
itself, we can, as did Grant Gilmore, reasonably trace the present UCC
18
law of checks to the last half of the eighteenth century. Commerce of
the industrial revolution age required a means of payment that did not
involve hauling around bags of metallic specie, and the solution
developed by merchants and bankers was the bill of exchange, the
19
instrument out of which bank checks developed. A bill of exchange was
simply a written instruction by one person, perhaps a merchant, to an
20
agent with whom the merchant had deposited money or credit. The
money was payable upon presentation of the bill to the agent, but the bill
21
could itself circulate in commerce. In international transactions, bills of
exchange allowed the transfer of valuethe right to obtain payment
from the agentdespite the existence of great distances and different
national coinage, as the agent could ultimately pay the bill of exchange in
22
the agent’s local currency. The UCC today uses the term “draft” to
describe this kind of three-party financial instrument, and checks are

17. See, e.g., James Steven Rogers, The End of Negotiable Instruments: Bringing Payment
Systems Law out of the Past 19 n. 1 (2012) (finding a “puzzling persistence” of the antiquated law of
bills and notes in modern commerce); Neil B. Cohen, The Calamitous Law of Notes, 68 Ohio St. L.J.
161, 161 (2007) (“The law of negotiable instruments is hemmed in on one side by its own antiquity and
on the other by the emergence of electronic communications.”).
18. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 Creighton L. Rev. 441,
448 (1979).
19. Id. at 447.
20. See Dale A. Whitman, Reforming the Law: The Payment Rule as a Paradigm, 1998 BYU L.
Rev. 1169, 1170 n.5 (1998) (“The original negotiable instruments were ‘inland bills of exchange,’
typically issued by merchants, but the concept was extended to promissory notes by the end of the
eighteenth century.”).
21. Id.
22. For a more detailed description of bills of exchange, which is beyond the scope of this Article,
see Rogers, supra note 17, at 26–31.
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accordingly a “draft” that is drawn upon a bank, which thus occupies the
23
position of the merchant agent in the example above.
Although bills of exchange initially arose in international commerce,
buyers and sellers in industrial England began using them in purely
24
domestic transactions as well. As such bills never necessarily left the
shores of Britain, they came to be known as inland bills of exchange. In
1764, Lord Mansfield held these bills of exchange to be negotiable and
thus capable of coming into possession of a “good faith purchaser” who
25
took free of claimed defects in the underlying transaction. A good faith
purchaser ultimately became known as a “holder in due course” under
26
the English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882 As for checks as a species of
commercial paper, they came into general use in England in
27
approximately 1780. The English terminology eventually made its way
across the Atlantic, such that American courts used it as well. For
example, the Michigan Supreme Court explained in an 1889 criminal case
involving the forged indorsement of a check that, “[a]ll checks come within
the meaning and definition of a bill of exchange, but all bills of exchange
are not checks. . . . They are commercial paper, and are governed by the
same rules as to presentment and notice of non-payment as inland bills of
28
exchange . . . .” The characteristics separating a check from other bills of
exchange were that it was drawn on a bank and was payable to the bearer
29
on demand. The fact that checks are a species of the inland bill of
exchange has been declared by no less an authority than the U.S. Supreme
30
Court, albeit in the pre-Erie days where it actually heard cases of
31
domestic commercial law.
23. See U.C.C. § 3-104(e) & (f) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2015) (defining “draft” and
“check” respectively).
24. See generally Frederick K. Beutel, The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early
English Law, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1938) (discussing the origin and development of early English law
governing negotiable paper).
25. Grant v. Vaughan (1764) 96 Eng. Rep. 281 (K.B.); see M.B.W. Sinclair, Codification of
Negotiable Instruments Law: A Tale of Reiterated Anachronism, 21 U. Tol. L. Rev. 625, 632–33 (1990)
(describing Lord Mansfield’s application of the 1704 Statute of Anne in the Grant case).
26. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 449 n.14.
27. Henry J. Bailey & Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady on Bank Checks: The Law of Bank
Checks ¶ 1.1 (7th ed. 1992).
28. People v. Kemp, 76 Mich. 410, 416 (1889); see Merchants’ Bank v. State Bank, 77 U.S. 604,
647 (1870) (“Bank checks are not inland bills of exchange, but have many of the properties of such
commercial paper; and many of the rules of the law merchant are alike applicable to both.”).
29. Bailey & Hagedorn, supra note 27, at ¶ 1.1.
30. Rogers v. Durant, 140 U.S. 298, 303 (1891) (“According to all the text writers on bills and
notes, as well as in numerous decisions, a check is denominated a species of inland bill of exchange,
not with all the incidents of an ordinary bill of exchange . . . .”) (quoting approvingly Moses v. Franklin
Bank, 34 Md. 574 (1871)).
31. J. Benton Hurst, De Facto Supremacy: Supreme Court Control of State Commercial Law, 98 Va.
L. Rev. 691, 693 (2012) (noting that a pre-1938 “willingness of state courts to follow the Supreme Court
on questions of commercial law created a de facto supremacy for the Supreme Court, even where it could
not directly review cases.”); see William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
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The late 1700s were thus the era in which “the courts, English and
American, put together, in not much more than half a century, the law of
32
negotiable instruments almost exactly as we know it today.” Under the
English common law as developed in the late 1700s, “private negotiable
instruments were legally recognized and thus became more widely used
33
by ordinary people.” On the eve of the twentieth century, the law of
negotiable instruments stood much as it does now. Eighteenth century
34
concepts such as indorsements and allongesremain in the UCC law
35
of checking to this very day.
Despite its common law pedigree, the law of checks and other
negotiable instruments also has the distinction of being the first major
success at being moved out of the common law through codification by
36
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (“NIL”) was promulgated by
37
the Commission in 1896. The NIL was heavily influenced by the English
Bills of Exchange Act, as the lead drafter, attorney J.J. Crawford of New
York City, had a mandate from the Commission to follow the English
38
statute “as much as he thought it applicable to American conditions.”
The NIL was also notable for its more expansive unification of
commercial paper on the rubric of “negotiable instruments,” and on that
39
count seems to have drawn on an 1876 codification in California. By

Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1513 (1984)
(recounting that in 1842 “the Supreme Court held in Swift v. Tyson that it was not bound . . . to follow
state court decisions on matters of general commercial law.”). Swift, interestingly, was a case involving
the law of negotiable instruments. See id. at 1514 (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)).
32. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 448.
33. Alvin C. Harrell, Book Review and Commentary: James Steven Rogers, the End of Negotiable
Instruments, 66 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 220, 222 (2012).
34. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 448 n.13 (citing Peacock v. Rhodes (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 402, 402
(K.B.) and Robertson v. Kensington, 128 Eng. Rep. 238, 239 (Ex. 1811)).
35. See U.C.C. § 3-204(a) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2015) (defining “indorsement”
and, in consideration of the possibility of signatures placed on an allonge, providing that “a paper
affixed to the instrument is part of the instrument”); see also Sinclair, supra note 25, at 676 (criticizing
the 1990 revision of Article 3 because it “would be more in accord with present realities to have
allowed for indorsements on paper only loosely attached, or separable allonges, provided that there is
no doubt as to the chain of title.”).
36. In 2006, NCCUSL amended its constitution to provide that it may also be known as the
“Uniform Law Commission” or “ULC.” Robert A. Stein, Forming a More Perfect Union: A
History of the Uniform Law Commission 20–21 (2013). For consistency’s sake, this Article will tend
to refer to NCCUSL and the ULC simply as “the Commission,” unless context requires otherwise.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Frederick K. Beutel, The Development of State Statutes on Negotiable Paper Prior to the
Negotiable Instruments Law, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 836, 852 (1940); see Stein, supra note 36, at 9.
39. Beutel, supra note 38, at 851; see William E. Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and
Notes (2d ed. 1961) (“The Conference had as its model [for the NIL] the English Bills of Exchange
Act. This Act deals only with the law of bills of exchange, with separate sections dealing with
promissory notes and checks. The draftsmen of the American Act departed from this policy and
drafted an act applicable to negotiable instruments generally.”).
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1924, the NIL had the distinction of having been adopted by every
40
41
American state, a first for the uniform laws drafting process. The NIL
provisions on bank checks, however, trace back to the 1882 English Act,
and ultimately to the same needs of commerce that Lord Mansfield
42
sought to address in the mid-1700s.
The 1940s began with the NIL in a position of overwhelming
legislative acceptance, but in the midst of dissatisfaction with the state of
43
commercial law as a whole. Between 1906 and 1908, the Commission
had promulgated several other commercial statutes, such as the Uniform
Sales Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and the Uniform Stock
44
Transfer Act, all of which achieved widespread adoption. Many thought
that provisions of these acts “had become, if not obsolete, at least not
45
suitable to govern the business practices of the day.” With that
perspective, Commission President William Schnader proposed the
46
creation of a comprehensive commercial code in his 1940 address. At
first, that project advanced largely as a function of Karl Llewellyn’s
existing effort at drafting a Revised Uniform Sales Actthe genesis of
47
what became UCC Article 2. The project gained heft and momentum
after 1944, when the American Law Institute (“ALI”) signed a formal
agreement with the Commission to prepare the UCC as a joint
48
undertaking. The “real work” on organization and drafting began on
49
January 1, 1945, with Karl Llewellyn at the helm as Chief Reporter.
The initial promulgated version of the UCC came about in late
50
1951, but Article 4, concerning bank deposits and collections, almost did
not make the cut. In May 1951, the ALI decided to eliminate Article 4.
President Schnader, who was also an original drafting committee

40. William E. Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 153–54 (1953).
41. See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 2 (1967); Stein, supra note 36, at 9.
42. Cf. Gilmore, supra note 18, at 448 (“Indeed anyone who has mastered the current American
formulation of . . . Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code will have a startling sense of déjà vuI
suppose this is déjà vu in reverseif he then goes back to the mid-nineteenth century treatises[.]”);
Britton, supra note 39, at 13 (“[T]he law with respect to bills and notes was essentially the common
law found in the decisions of English Courts from 1600 to the date of enactment of the English Bills of
Exchange Act in 1882 and in the decisions of the state and federal courts of the United States.”).
43. See generally Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code,
58 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 799 (1958) (describing the legislative history and drafting of the UCC).
44. Id.
45. Schnader, supra note 41, at 2.
46. Id.
47. See generally Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 194049, 51 S.M.U. L. Rev. 275, 299–313 (1998) (describing progress of the 1941–44 drafts of the Revised
Uniform Sales Act).
48. Id. at 313; Schnader, supra note 41, at 3.
49. Schnader, supra note 41, at 5.
50. Id. at 7.
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member, later attributed the saving of Article 4 to an eleventh hour
rewrite and lobbying efforts by Walter Malcolm, “one of the nation’s
outstanding bank lawyers” and also Chair of the American Bar
51
Association Committee on the Commercial Code. Not everyone was so
complimentary of the product produced by a lawyer for banking interests.
Critics ranged from prominent negotiable instruments scholar Frederick
52
Beutelwho declared that the entire UCC should be rejected to
Article 9 architect Grant Gilmore, who wrote a vigorous defense of the
UCC as a whole in the Yale Law Journal, but simultaneously admitted he
53
would be happy to see Article 4 dropped. Gilmore later analogized the
entrusting of Article 4 to a committee of bank counsel “as tantamount to
appointing a committee of dogs to draw up a protective ordinance for
54
cats.” Critics of Article 4 have also criticized it as nothing more than a
55
“refurbished version of the Bank Collection Code,” a statute drafted by
the American Bankers Association that was relatively unsuccessful in
56
achieving enactment, at least in comparison to the NIL.
A principal point of contention regarding Article 4 was an issue that
looms large today: Where should the divide be between flexible, but
open to abuse, private law, and rigid, but intentionally protective, public
57
law? The banking and business interests favored private law and
58
“freedom of contract,” and UCC section 4-103, as ultimately adopted,
did as well, with the effect that private law supplanted public regulation
far more than many wanted. To this very day, Article 4 reflects a
59
significant role for private law even in the midst of a comprehensive
public law structure:

51. Id.
52. Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted,
61 Yale L.J. 334, 363 (1952) (“The existence of Article 4 alone is enough to condemn in its entirety
the adoption of [the Uniform Commercial Code].”).
53. Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L.J.
364, 374 (1952) (“While I do not agree with many of the details of Beutel’s criticism of Article 4, I do
not care to urge enactment of the present text of the Article.”).
54. Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949-1954, 49 Buff.
L. Rev. 359, 452 (2001) (quoting Letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Rapson (Oct. 8, 1980)).
55. Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 Ala. L.
Rev. 551, 555 (1991).
56. Id. at 553 (observing that the pre-UCC Bank Collection Code “did not meet with a positive
reception, for the most part . . . .”).
57. Kamp supra, note 54, at 406–11 (describing debates in the UCC drafting process over whether
its statutory terms should be predominantly mandatory or predominantly permissive).
58. Id. at 453 (quoting Walter Malcom).
59. Accord Gregory E. Maggs, A Complaint About Payment Law Under the U.C.C.: What You
See Is Often Not What You Get, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 201, 211 (2007) (observing that some UCC rules “do
not apply because the parties routinely waive them by contract.”).
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The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement
except that no agreement can disclaim a bank’s responsibility for its
lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or limit the
measure of damages for the lack or failure; but the parties may by
agreement determine the standards by which such responsibility is to be
60
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.

Section 4-103 of the UCC also, by political and practical necessity,
contained concession to public regulation at the federal level. Regulations
and operating circulars of the Federal Reserve also supersede provisions of
61
Article 4. The 1951 redraft of Article 4 was accepted, but its near-death
experience and the aftermath were a harbinger of structural difficulties still
to come. For the most part, Article 3 did not arouse widespread feelings
62
for or against it, though it admittedly was caught up in criticism of the
UCC as a whole.
The ultimate enactment of Articles 3 and 4 was more of a triumph
for continuity than for reform. Payments by check were subject to
statutory regulation, but the regulation was on terms acceptable to the
bankers in the business of collecting checks, so long as such terms were
63
acquiesced to by the Federal Reserve System. Despite disagreement on
particular nuances as against its predecessors, the UCC in fact “went to
great lengths to recreate and codify the earlier Negotiable Instruments
64
Law and Bank Collections Code.”
By 1967, all articles of the UCC had been enacted in forty-nine
65
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The fiftieth
state, civil law Louisiana, ultimately adopted parts of the UCC, including
66
the payment articles. Despite the hints shown during the Article 4
controversies over the role of private contract, the future looked bright
for the existence and growth of payments law as public law at the state
level. Lord Mansfield’s negotiable instruments system was intact, with
the bank check as the lineal descendant of the original three-party inland

60. U.C.C. § 4-103(a) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2015) (emphasis added).
61. Id. § 4-103(b)–(c).
62. See, e.g., Britton, supra note 40, at 171 (“Some changes [from the NIL to UCC Article 3] are
thought to be improvements and some are thought not to be. But whichever of two competing rules is
in force will make little or no difference to the man in the street and, for that matter, little difference
even to bankers.”).
63. Henry J. Bailey, New 1990 Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3, Negotiable Instruments, and
Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections, 29 Willamette L. Rev. 409, 413 (1993) (observing that UCC
section 3-102(c) adds a provision that Federal Reserve Regulations and Federal Reserve Bank
operating circulars govern any inconsistent Article 3 provision).
64. Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and
the Race to the Bottom, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 569, 571 n.5 (1998).
65. Schnader, supra note 41, at 9–10; Burge, supra note 5, at 360–61 (describing successes in the
original enactment of and revisions to the UCC).
66. Agustín Parise, A Constant Give and Take: Tracing Legal Borrowings in the Louisiana Civil
Law Experience, 35 Seton Hall Legis. J. 1, 29 (2010) (recounting “the gradual adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code in Louisiana, with the exception of articles 2 (sales) and 6 (bulk sales).”).
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bill of exchange. Looks can be deceiving, however. Electronics, plastic,
and institutional inertia were already setting the stage to marginalize the
UCC paradigm for governing payments.
II. The Long, Inconsistent Decline of Public Payments Law
Following the late-1960s triumph of the UCC in state legislatures,
one might have believed that the future governance of payment
transactions rested securely in comprehensive state law. Yet even in an
era dominated by checks for noncash payments, innovations were
already afoot outside of the known and settled legal framework. “In most
fields of law,” James Rogers has observed, “developments of that sort
would be reflected by changes or additions to the basic structure of the
68
legal rules. Payment systems law has been different.” Indeed it has. The
new noncash systems for payment arose in comparative disregard of the
legal milieu of the UCC. While payment cards and automated clearing
house payments have been impacted by public law, the outstanding
commonality of these innovations was and remains the dominant role of
private law, particularly the law of assent to contractual obligations.
A. Payment Cards and Private Contracts
The shift in noncash payments away from checks since the dawn of the
twenty-first century has been dramatic, as statistics from the 2013 Federal
69
Reserve Payments Study demonstrate. In 2000, 41.9 billion checks were
paid in the United States, accounting for a solid fifty-eight percent of all
70
noncash payments. By 2012, the number of paid checks had declined to
71
18.3 billion, representing only fifteen percent of noncash payments. The
overwhelming majority of the lost check volume in that twelve-year period
is attributable to increased use of credit cards and debit cards. Back in
2000, these two types of payment cards accounted for 21.7 billion
72
paymentsroughly one-third of all noncash payments in the United States.
For 2012, credit and debit card use collectively had ballooned to 73.2 billion
payments, that constituted fifty-nine percent of all noncash payments in the
73
country. Credit and debit cards today thus occupy the majority payment
systems role held by checks as little as fifteen years ago.
67. See Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93 Geo. L.J. 633,
641 (2005) (“The negotiable instrument, of course, has been superseded by . . . its main surviving
descendant, the check . . . .”).
68. Rogers, supra note 17, at xiv.
69. Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 8, at 16.
70. Id. at 15.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 7. Most of the remaining noncash payments unaccounted for in this summary were by
automated clearinghouse (“ACH”), a payment system discussed at more length later in this Article.
See infra Part II.B.
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This transition away from checks did not occur overnight. Privateissue credit cardsa mechanism by which retailers extended credit to
their customersdate back to the early twentieth century, as the cards
74
were issued by hotels, large department stores, and gas station chains.
As is true with such cards today, they could be used only with the issuing
retailer, and thus represented more of a form of revolving customer
credit than a payment system. Most trace the creation of the third-party
universal credit card to Diners Club in 1949, which developed a network
of travel and entertainment retailers who accepted the card for
75
payment. The typical end-user was “the salesman who could charge
76
meals at restaurants while entertaining clients on the road.” Traveler’s
check giant American Express entered the universal card market in 1958,
as did a number of large banks, including California-based Bank of
America. Its “BankAmericard” was able to expand greatly outside of its
California home in the mid-1960s with a licensing structure allowing
77
other banks to issue the branded card. With widespread branding and
merchant acceptance, a card issued by a network of banks could achieve
much greater market penetration with merchants and end-users than
could a single bank’s card, as attested to by the failure of bank credit
cards in the 1960s, when even the enormous Chase Manhattan folded its
78
operations. Following shortly behind Bank of America’s expansion, a
group of large banksgenerally centered more in the eastern half of the
countryformed the Interbank Card Association, thus creating a second
79
large, multibank card network built around the “Master Charge” card.
Bank Americard changed its name to Visa in 1976 “to develop a more
80
international image” that was not tied to the name of a particular bank.
81
Master Charge followed suit in 1980, changing its name to MasterCard.
While Visa and MasterCard grew on the credit-issuing side of the
market, American Express came to eclipse Diners Club in the traveland-entertainment (“T&E”) charge card market. Today, the distinction
between corporate T&E charge card brands (like American Express) and
general-purpose credit cards (like MasterCard and Visa) has faded, with
American Express crossing over into the general use and credit market
82
while MasterCard and Visa have cultivated corporate accounts. The last

74. Gillian Garcia, Credit Cards: An Interdisciplinary Survey, 6 J. Consumer Res. 327, 327 (1980).
75. Mandell, supra note 12, at xiii.
76. Id. at xiv.
77. Eric E. Bergsten, Credit CardsA Prelude to the Cashless Society, 8 B.C. Indus. & Com. L.
Rev. 485, 486 n.3 (1967).
78. Mandell, supra note 12, at xiv.
79. Id.
80. Id. at xv.
81. Id.
82. Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of Payment
Systems, 12 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 425, 430 (2007) (“American Express and Discover are independent
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of today’s four major American payment card brandsDiscoverwas
83
launched by Sears in 1986. Discover sought a general use customer base
like MasterCard and Visa, but like American Express, began as a direct84
issue card rather than a brand licensed through banks.
General purpose payment card transactions are thus typically
conducted through one of the four major card networks: MasterCard,
85
Visa, American Express, and Discover. The networks are functionally
either open or closed. MasterCard and Visa are the prototypical open
networks, allowing many banks to participate as card issuers if they
86
contract to license the brand. American Express and Discover, in
contrast, began life as closed card networks, cutting out the licensing
banks, though today they also operate open networks on the MasterCard
87
and Visa model. In an open network purchase transaction, one bank
acts as the card issuer to the buyer, while another bank acts as the
88
acquirerthe seller’s bank that processes payments for that seller. In a
consumer transaction with a merchant, for example, the issuer bank
transfers funds to the acquirer bank. The merchant can then access the
funds at the acquirer bank, and the consumer receives a bill from the
89
issuer bank for the transferred funds. Banks issuing branded cards and
processing merchant payments may act as either the issuer or acquirer in
90
a given card transaction, conceivably even acting as both. In the middle
of the transactionbetween the issuer bank and the acquirer bankis
the card network. In a closed payment network, such as American
Express and Discover, the card issuer is also the merchant acquirer and
91
also operates the card network.
The card networks are, of course, not providing their services for
free. The most visible cost to the end-user of a credit card is interest

financial institutions, which both traditionally performed all three roles: issuer, acquirer, and network
itself. Recently, these networks began to allow other banks to issue cards with their brands, and
Discover has also begun to outsource its acquirer functions.”).
83. Mandell, supra note 12, at xxii.
84. See generally Our History, Discover Fin. Servs., https://www.discover.com/company/our-company/
our-history/ (providing a timeline of major developments since the first issuance of a Discover card in the
mid-1980s).
85. Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules,
and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 265, 275 (2005).
86. Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Context:
Structure, Reputation, and Incentives, 1 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 393, 424 (2005) (“An open system is a
payment system where an association or third-party company maintains a contractual relationship with
both the card issuer and the merchant acquirer . . . . Open systems include associations such as VISA
and MasterCard.”).
87. Id. at 425 (“Closed systems include programs such as department store cards, American
Express, and Discover.”).
88. Levitin, supra note 85, at 275.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 276.
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accruing on a carried balance, but that profit goes to the card issuing
bank, which took on the risk of extending credit to an end-user who
might default. On the acquirer side of the transaction, however, the
source of profit is the merchant discount. For example, on a card
purchase of $100, the merchant will only receive between $97 and
92
$98.50. The remaining $1.50 to three dollars is ultimately split between
the acquirer and the interchange fee charged by one of the open card
networks. In the case of a closed network, the entire discount amount
goes to the acquirer. For merchants, certainty of prompt payment and
customer convenience are the largest incentives for them to accept
93
payment cards and less than 100 cents on the dollar.
The same networks built to handle credit card transactions can also
handle debit card transactions. The payment experience for the
merchantfast payment certainty in exchange for accepting the merchant
discountis largely the same as for a credit card, though the amount and
94
allocation of interchange fees has been a point of contention. The
original debit cards were issued by regional automated teller machine
(“ATM”) networks in the late 1970s, adding point-of-sale functionality to
95
their initial ability to withdraw cash at ATMs. From the end-user’s
perspective, the main distinction between debit and credit is the source
of payment, with the former being a direct withdrawal from the user’s
bank account instead of an extension of credit on an open account.
Unlike twentieth century bank checks, which came into being with
both the benefit and burden of centuries of the public law of negotiable
instruments behind them, payment cards began life exclusively as
creatures of private contract. For example, a 1967 survey of cases on the
apportionment of liability between credit card issuers and cardholders for
unauthorized use carried an enormous caveat about drawing conclusions
from the cases: “Because of this reliance on private agreement rather than
public law, any analysis of the reported decisions must be made in light of
96
the type of agreement involved in each case.” In particular, analogy to
97
the public law of negotiable instruments was wholly inapt.
Growth in the use of credit cards eventually piqued the interest of
Congress, resulting in federal public law on point, but not a comprehensive
regulatory scheme. The 1970 amendments to TILA upended some parts of
the existing web of contracts by shifting liability for fraud losses from the

92. Cf. Morriss & Korosec, supra note 86, at 421 (“[T]ypical merchant acquirers in the United
States charge merchants a discount rate of between 1.5% and 3% of the purchase price.”).
93. Id.
94. David A. Balto, Creating a Payment System Network: The Tie That Binds or an Honorable
Peace?, 55 Bus. Law. 1391, 1392 (2000).
95. Id.
96. Bergsten, supra note 77, at 488 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 488–89 (citing Lit Bros. v. Haines, 121 A. 131 (N.J. 1923)).
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cardholder to the card issuer. The amended TILA, as is still the law
today, limited the liability of a cardholder for unauthorized use to fifty
99
dollars. The protective definition of “unauthorized use” covers “use of a
credit card by a person other than the cardholder who does not have
actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which the
100
cardholder receives no benefit.”
TILA further required the card issuer to notify the cardholder of the
101
potential liability, to provide the cardholder a means of notifying the
102
issuer of loss or theft of the card, and to provide the cardholder a
security method for identifying the user as the person authorized to use
103
the card. It also imposed procedural protections on card issuance, such
104
as by prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited credit cards. These changes,
while significant in their own right, also represented a new trend in
payments lawnon-comprehensive federal intervention. The TILA is
largely a consumer protection statute, as it does not apply to “[c]redit
transactions involving extensions of credit primarily for business,
commercial, or agricultural purposes, or to government . . . or to
105
106
organizations.” Regulation Z, implementing the TILA, likewise
affirms that this body of law is not all-encompassing governance of the
107
type that UCC Articles 3 and 4 attempt to provide for checks. The
targeted consumer protection role of TILA and Regulation Z has existed
for decades, but the focus became clearer with the passage of the 2010
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, as it
transferred authority over Regulation Z from the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System to the newly established Bureau of
108
Consumer Financial Protection.
The TILA also creates a right for credit card holders that, while
properly characterized as a consumer protection right, has nothing to do
with protection within the payment system itself. Within certain
limitations, TILA makes a credit card issuer “subject to all claims (other
than tort claims) and defenses arising out of any transaction in which the

98. Matthews, supra note 2, at 249–50.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (West 2012).
100. Id. § 1602(o).
101. Id. § 1643(a)(1)(C).
102. Id. § 1643(a)(1)(D).
103. Id. § 1643(a)(1)(F); see Matthews, supra note 2, at 250.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (West 2012) (“No credit card shall be issued except in response to a request
or application therefor.”).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1).
106. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.1 (2014).
107. See generally Id. § 1026.3 (listing transactions that are exempt from Regulation Z).
108. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (mandating reform in the American financial regulatory environment); see also
12 C.F.R. § 1026.1 (2014).
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credit card is used as a method of payment.” The consumer user of a
credit card thus has a right to withhold payment on a charge that is the
basis of an unresolved dispute with the merchant who charged the credit
110
account. Note that the right to withhold payment arises from a dispute
in an underlying purchase transaction, and not from a problem with the
card issuer or the payment network. In effect, the payment network is
here being used for a nonpayment purposeto shift the general balance
of power away from merchants and toward consumers by granting
consumers a self-help remedy that would not exist apart from the use of
a credit card. The payment card networks have adapted to this
requirement by operating chargeback systems by which transactions can
be reversed and the price charged back to the seller (through its
merchant acquirer) and credited to the consumer’s account through the
111
network. None of this activity resolves the actual merchant-consumer
dispute, but it changes who gets to hold the money pending resolution. In
a small-value claim, the consumer may win by default.
TILA provided protections for consumers, but only for consumers
112
using payment cards for extensions of creditnamely, credit card users
The defining feature of a debit card, in contrast, is that it does not
113
involve an extension of credit. The card is instead a means by which the
end-user can spend her own money. In the face of growth of consumer
ATM transactions and the small-but-growing consumer use of other
electronic means to transfer money, the 1978 Congress passed the
114
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”). The EFTA is effective
where there is “a card, code, or other means of access to a consumer’s
account for the purpose of initiating electronic fund transfers,” and
115
covers, among other things, ATM cards and general use debit cards.
The regulations implementing the EFTA, known as Regulation E, were
originally promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, butjust as
occurred with TILA and Regulation Zauthority for implementing the
EFTA was transferred to the new Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

109. 15 U.S.C. § 1666i(a) (West 2012).
110. Id.
111. Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better Than Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment Cards and Consumer
Protection Policy, 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 520, 534–35 (2006).
112. David Smith & Gregg Stevens, The Impact of TILA on the Debtor-Creditor Relationship, 61
Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 296, 307 (2007) (“Of course, the TILA applies only to credit transactions
entered into primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”).
113. Rosenberg, supra note 111, at 520 (describing debit cards as “payment cards that do not
require consumers to qualify for credit”).
114. See generally Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-630, Title XX, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (West 2010)).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(1) (West 2010) (defining “accepted card or other means of access”).
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Protection Act. Like its older TILA sibling, the EFTA is fundamentally
a consumer protection statute that does not on its face apply to electronic
117
funds transfers by businesses.
The EFTA and Regulation E govern the issuance and operation of
118
electronic funds transfer “access devices” like debit cards. The law also
limits the liability of consumers for unauthorized electronic funds
transfers, thus placing the risk of excess liability on the issuer of the debit
card or other access device. Consumers who notify the issuer within two
business days of learning of the loss or theft of their device have their
liability capped at fifty dollars, thus matching the TILA limit for credit
119
cards. Unlike the credit card limit, however, the EFTA contains two
120
additional tiers of potential consumer liability. A consumer who fails to
notify the issuer within two business days faces an increased liability limit
121
of $500. Beyond that, a consumer faces unlimited liability for use
beginning sixty days after a statement of account showing the original
unauthorized use, if such losses would not have occurred “but for” the
122
In many
consumers failure to contact her financial institution.
circumstances, the $500 and unlimited tiers of liability cannot occur
because of greater customer protections in her contract with the bank.
As banks have sought to promote the use of debit cards in lieu of paper
123
checks, many contractually capped customer liability at fifty dollars.
Contractually providing for zero liability for unauthorized use is also a
practice that evens the legal playing field between debit and credit
124
cards. Such a system allows the banks issuing debit cards to state,
relatively truthfully, that their customers’ accounts are no more at risk

116. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No 111–203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (transferring authority to the CFPB in section 1011).
117. C. Bradford Biddle, Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital Signature Act and Liability
Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 1143, 1170 (1996) (describing both the
EFTA and TILA as “consumer-protection statutes”).
118. 12 C.F.R. § 1005.4–1005.8 (2015).
119. Id. § 1005.6(b)(2).
120. See generally Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition between
Established and Emerging Electronic Payment Systems, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 675, 688 (1999) (“In
marked contrast to the flat $50 limit on consumer liability under Regulation Z, Regulation E
contemplates that a consumer who completely fails to notify a financial institution after losing the card
may be exposed to losses without any statutory cap.”).
121. 12 C.F.R. § 1005.6(b)(2) (2015).
122. Id. § 1005.6(b)(3).
123. See Ronald J. Mann, Payment Systems and Other Financial Transactions 70 (6th ed. 2016).
124. See, e.g., Visa Debit/Check Card FAQ, Visa, https://www.visa.com/chip/personal/security/zeroliability.jsp (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“Visa’s Zero Liability Policy is our guarantee that you won’t be held
responsible for unauthorized charges made with your account or account information. You’re protected if
your Visa credit or debit card is lost, stolen or fraudulently used, online or offline.” (footnote omitted)).
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using a debit card with direct access to their bank accounts than they
125
would be using a completely unconnected credit card.
In the decades since enactment of the TILA and EFTA payment card
provisions, the payments law under these statutes has been relatively
stable, but with one substantial exception on the credit side. In 2009,
Congress enacted the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and
126
Disclosure Act (“CARD Act”). The CARD Actlike the provisions of
its TILA predecessoraimed squarely at consumer protection by
reigning in certain terms in issuer-consumer credit card contracts. The
CARD Act placed limits on the timing and ability of issuers to increase
127
128
interest rates. It also mandated a variety of plain language disclosures
and restricted the means and method by which card issuers could enroll
129
younger adults, like college students. The general goal of the CARD
Act was to empower consumer decision making through information and
by increasing the number of avenues where consumers could exercise
130
that decisionmaking ability.
The rise and widespread success of payment cards and their
networks, generally to the detriment of checks, demonstrated beyond all
doubt that a robust payment system can exist absent a comprehensive
public law scheme. The payment card systems are instead built on a
collection of private contracts, including those between card issuers and
users, card issuers and the card network, the card network and merchantbank acquirers, and acquirers and their accepting merchants. Yet, this
system dominated by private law hasperhaps as an unwitting cost to
sustaining operational private governancelived with consumer protection
law at the federal level for several decades. The TILA (affecting credit
cards) and the EFTA (affecting debit cards) have taken many of the rough
edges off the victimization of card users by oppression, fraud, and mistake.
The success of this approach, while certainly not a success of the
125. See, e.g., Zero Liability Protection, MasterCard, https://www.mastercard.us/en-us/aboutmastercard/what-we-do/terms-of-use/zero-liability-terms-conditions.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“As
a MasterCard cardholder, Zero Liability applies to your purchases made in the store, over the telephone,
online, or via a mobile device and ATM transactions. As a cardholder, you will not be held responsible
for unauthorized transactions . . . .”).
126. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1734 (2010).
127. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i) (West 2016) (“Advance notice of rate increase and other charges
required”); 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1 (West 2016) (“Limits on interest rate, fee, and finance charge increases
applicable to outstanding balances”).
128. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a) (West 2016) (“Disclosure requirements for open end consumer
credit plans secured by consumer’s principal dwelling”); 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (West 2016) (“Required
disclosures by creditor”).
129. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1637(r) (West 2016) (“College card agreements”).
130. Joseph U. Schorer, The Credit Card Act of 2009: Credit Card Reform and the Uneasy Case for
Disclosure, 127 Banking L.J. 924, 925 (2010) (“[T]he CARD Act also contains an array of features
that can be loosely described as efforts to improve consumer ‘disclosure’ so that consumers, rather
than legislators or regulators, can decide whether and how to use their credit cards.”).
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coordinated design that characterizes the UCC, certainly must be a major
factor in any evaluation of the future of the law of payments, including
the evaluation in this Article.
B. Automated Clearing House PaymentsLaw as a
Public-Private Partnership
While payment card systems arose in a manner highly visible to the
end-user of the system, automated clearing house payments generally
arose behind the scenes on the operational side of the banking industry.
A typical consumer on the street is likely aware of such services as direct
deposit or on-line bill pay, but he is just as likely not familiar with the
term “automated clearing house.” Nonetheless, expansion into public
awareness will likely increase exponentially with the phasing in of “Same
131
Day ACH,” which is tentatively scheduled to begin in September 2016.
A system once principally of concern to the back rooms of banks will be
front and center to a growing number of end-users. The development
and governance of the ACH system must also be a part of any
conversation on the future of payment systems. For present purposes, its
structure as a public-private partnership is of particular importance, as is
the scope of its rules outside of the public law sector.
The original innovation of an automated clearing house, which
settles transactions among banks, suggests a manual predecessor as
indeed there was. “A clearing house,” said a 1915 treatise, “may be
described as a place where the representatives of various member banks
meet and, under the supervision of a competent committee or officer
selected by them, make or receive payment of balances and so ‘clear’ the
132
transactions of the day upon which the settlement is made.” Thus, the
purpose of the manual clearing house was centralized coordination as to
delivery and receipt of paper checks, along with settling the related bankcustomer accounts.
In the United States, an association of over fifty New York banks
133
Before the
organized the New York Clearing House in 1853.
establishment of a centralized clearing house, bank checks were settled
on an individual bank-to-bank basis, a process that at the time involved
134
porters carrying actual bags of money amongst the banks. This process

131. NACHA Membership Approves Same Day ACH, NACHA (May 19, 2015), https://www.nacha.org/
news/nacha-membership-approves-same-day-ach (stating that “Same Day ACH will be implemented in a
phased approach” with the first phase supporting uses like “hourly payroll, person-to-person (P2P) payments
and same-day bill pay.”).
132. John Edson Brady, The Law of Bank Checks 331 (1915).
133. About TCH: A Look Back, The Clearing House, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/about-tch/
a-look-back. The New York Clearing House, while still based in New York, is now known as “The
Clearing House.” Id.
134. Albert R. Barrett, Modern Banking Methods and Practical Bank Bookkeeping 246 (1903).
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was becoming increasingly cumbersomenot to mention riskyfor the
nation’s growing financial capital, hence the idea that the area banks
would benefit from the efficiency of clearing their transactions
135
centrally. Other regions eventually followed New York’s example for
136
processing local paper checks. The establishment of the Federal
Reserve in 1913 provided the basis for a national framework for clearing
137
checks across regions.
An ACH is essentially the extension of the paper check processing
function of the original manual clearing houses into the realm of
138
nonpaper payments. The ACH concept first originated in California in
1968, when the Los Angeles and San Francisco Clearing House
Associations established the Special Committee on Paperless Entries
(“SCOPE”), with a charge to study the possibility of reducing the need for
139
banks to handle paper checks. By 1972, SCOPE had developed a
computer software package and operational rules that became the basis for
the California Automated Clearing House Association, a membership
140
association made up of California banks. Similar regional associations
organized shortly thereafter in Georgia, the Upper Midwest, and New
England, all enabling their members to handle batched electronic
141
payments within their respective regions.
In 1974, these four regional ACH Associations formed NACHA
142
initially as a unit within the American Bankers Association. Both
NACHA and the Federal Reserve Bank licensed the existing SCOPE
143
software as the basis for a unified payments platform. Other regions
soon joined in, such that by 1978, financial institutions located anywhere
in the United States had the ability to exchange ACH payments within
144
the framework of a common set of rules promulgated by NACHA.

135. Id. (“The annoyance of this was so great that it necessitated the organization of a clearinghouse.”).
136. Id. at 246–48 (describing early twentieth century clearing house processes in Boston,
Philadelphia, Chicago, and Minneapolis).
137. The Federal Reserve Act provides that “[e]very Federal reserve bank shall receive on deposit
at par from depository institutions or from Federal reserve banks checks and . . . drafts drawn upon
any of its depositors . . .” Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94 § 16, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 221 (West 2015)); see generally Farmers’ & Merchs’ Bank of Monroe, N. C. v.
Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, VA., 262 U.S. 649 (1923) (describing the check-clearing function of
the regional Federal Reserve Banks); Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 792 (1978).
138. Fredric H. Karr, Automated Clearing Houses: The Case for Barring Thrift Institutions, 95
Banking L.J. 823, 827 (1978) (“[A]n ACH is functionally similar to a traditional paper-based clearing
house . . . .”).
139. Nat’l Comm’n on Elec. Fund Transfers, EFT and the Public Interest, 65–66 (1977).
140. Id. at 66.
141. NACHA at 40, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/s/timeline/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
142. History and Network Statistics, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/ach-network/timeline (last visited
Aug. 5, 2016).
143. NACHA at 40, supra note 141.
144. History and Network Statistics, supra note 142.
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The NACHA payments network has grown substantially over the
last several decades, with the volume of ACH processed payments
145
expanding from just over one billion in 1988, to nearly twenty-three
billion payments in 2014, with 2014 itself reflecting an increase of one
146
billion payment transactions over 2013. This growth not only includes
payments that originate electronicallylike direct deposit payroll and
on-line bill paybut it also includes the conversion of check payments
into ACH payments, which then never enter the check-collection system.
In 2006, for example, about eight percent of all checks written were
converted to ACH payments, dramatic growth when compared with less
147
than one percent of such checks three years earlier in 2003. In 2013,
these Point-of-Purchase (“POP”) entries converted from checks
accounted for over 406 million ACH transactions, albeit dropping to
148
under 359 million in 2014. Interestingly, that forty-seven million
decrease in volume of POP transactions, originating from paper,
coincided with an increase of more than one billion ACH transactions
149
during the same period, suggesting no resurgence in check-writing, but
instead an increase in payment formats that do not involve checks at
150
all.
NACHA’s rulemaking and governance process is formally private,
with ultimate approval of new and revised rules in the hands of its
151
The ACH system may, however, be more accurately
members.
characterized as a public-private partnership. The input, influence, and
acquiescence of affected government agencies is clearly necessary to the
success of the private system. Federal government participation is
necessary and significant for at least two reasons. First, one of the largest
and most longstanding uses of the ACH payment structure is for federal
payments, such as employee payroll direct deposit, entitlement and
152
benefits program payments, and federal income tax refunds. A system
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Amelia H. Boss, Convergence in Electronic Banking: Technological Convergence, Systems
Convergence, Legal Convergence, 2 Drexel L. Rev. 63, 67–68 (2009).
148. History and Network Statics, supra note 142.
149. Id.
150. The smaller ACH transaction category for re-presented check entries (“RCK”) is used for
checks that were first processed through the check collection system but were returned due to
insufficient funds. RCK, like POP, similarly reflected a category decline in the face of overall ACH
expansion, also suggesting lessened initial use of checks for payment. Id. (stating a 15.8% decline in
RCK-coded ACH transactions from 4,573,791 in 2013 to 3,850,934 in 2014). The same point holds true
for back-office conversion (BOC), an ACH type where the check is converted after the point of sale,
as it declined from 178,262,806 transactions in 2013 to 163,654,206 in 2014, also during otherwise
substantial growth in use of the ACH network. Id.
151. About NACHA, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/about (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“NACHA
administers and facilitates private-sector operating rules for ACH payments, which define the roles
and responsibilities of financial institutions and other ACH Network participants.” (emphasis added)).
152. Nat’l Comm’n on Elec. Fund Transfers, supra note 139, at 65–66.
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that did not meet the needs of and incorporate the input of agencies like
the U.S. Treasury Department and the Social Security Administration
would soon find itself displaced, either by a private competitor
orperhaps more likelya fully public law governance and regulatory
structure. The second reason that federal government participation rises
to the level of a partnership (albeit with public agencies filling a
nominally junior role) is that the Federal Reserve System and its
constituent regional banks are a critical and indispensable component of
the current U.S. banking system. The Federal Reserve provides the
infrastructure and trusted intermediary by which payment processing
could grow from being merely locally effective and consistent to being a
truly national system of commerce.
A recent major rulemaking helps illustrate the players and process
in NACHA’s governance, including its structural role in a public-private
partnership with the Federal Reserve. On May 19, 2015, NACHA
announced the adoption of its same day ACH rules, an action NACHA
intends to create “a building block for a variety of products and services”
by providing for rapid and comparatively inexpensive movement of
153
money, bringing many electronic payment transactions closer to the
instantaneous nature of cash. The rule anticipates three phases of
implementation, each adding additional use cases for which the service
154
will be available. Same day ACH certainly has the potential to be a
payment systems game changer and a major means for expanding the
role of the ACH system as a whole.
NACHA’s process of getting to a final private rule is one that would
be familiar to any student of administrative laws notice-and-comment
155
rulemaking, with NACHA playing the role of the administrative
agency. An idea for a rule proposal must come in the first instance from
an “eligible party,” which includes NACHA officers and staff, direct
member organizations (such as regional ACH associations), ACH
156
operators, and government agencies. Stated examples of the important
governmental category include the Treasury Department, the Federal

153. NACHA Membership Approves Same Day ACH, NACHA (last visited Aug. 5, 2016), https://
www.nacha.org/news/nacha-membership-approves-same-day-ach (quoting Janet O. Estep, President and
CEO of NACHA).
154. Id. (“In Phase 1, ACH credit transactions will be eligible for same day processing, supporting
use cases such as hourly payroll, person-to-person (P2P) payments and same-day bill pay. In Phase 2,
same-day ACH debits will be added, allowing for a wide variety of consumer bill payment use cases
like utility, mortgage, loan and credit card payments. Phase 3 introduces faster ACH credit funds
availability requirements for RDFIs; funds from Same Day ACH credit transactions will need to be
available to customers by 5 p.m. RDFI local time. Phase 1 is scheduled to begin September 23, 2016.”).
155. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (West 2012) (stating legal requirements of federal agency
rulemaking processes).
156. How the Rules Are Made, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/how-rules-are-made (last
visited Aug. 5, 2016).
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Reserve Board, and the Social Security Administration. An eligible
proposal then goes to NACHA’s Rules and Operations Committee,
158
“which consists of industry representatives from ACH Network users.”
The Rules and Operations Committee can either reject the proposal or
let it continue in the process, which includes assigning the proposed rule
to a Standing Rules Group appointed from ACH network users, such as
159
businesses and financial institutions. For a major rulemaking such as
Same Day ACH, the Committee will develop a Request for Comment
(“RFC”) or Request for Information (“RFI”) with assistance from the
Group. These requests are then submitted to the NACHA membership,
160
ultimately resulting in staff-drafted language of a proposed rule.
The Same Day ACH process resulted in an RFC in December 2014.
Within a two-month comment period, NACHA received 214 responses
to the request, either in the form of member surveys or comment
161
letters. Individual financial institutions provided the bulk of the survey
responses (141), while more prosaic comment letters most often came
162
from multi-member associations (24). Based on the RFC responses,
163
NACHA modified the proposal to account for operational concerns.
To become effective, a proposed NACHA rule must gain the approval of
one of two alternative types of supermajority: (1) three-quarters of the
total membership; or (2) two-thirds of the “weighted” vote based on the
ACH volume of a member organization and the number of financial
institutions represented by the organization. Additionally, if two-thirds
of any one particular member category (such as Regional Payments
Associations or Direct Financial Institutions) oppose a proposed rule, it
164
cannot pass. In sum, a proposed rule impacting the technical operations
of the institutions affected by the proposal cannot come into force unless
it has extraordinarily broad support. Such a governance timetable and
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Same Day ACH RFC Summary, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/same-day-ach-rfcsummary (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
162. See id. (describing the RFC respondent demographics).
163. NACHA Membership Approves Same Day ACH, NACHA (May 19, 2015), https://www.nacha.org/
news/nacha-membership-approves-same-day-ach (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“The final rule closely mirrors
the proposal outlined in the industry Request for Comment (RFC). With broad ACH Network user
support for that proposal, modifications to the final rule were predominantly technical and operational
in nature. Specifically, there were three key changes, reflecting feedback from the RFC process. First,
the morning same-day window was modified to allow for more time to process transactions, with
settlement occurring at 1:00 p.m. ET. This new settlement time would become effective in Phase 1
instead of Phase 3, as originally proposed. Secondly, the rule creates an option for an additional
method for ODFIs to use, at their discretion, with their Originators to determine intent for same-day
settlement. Finally, there was an adjustment to the methodology for calculating the Same Day Entry
fee to exclude opportunity costs from its calculation.”).
164. How the Rules Are Made, supra note 156.
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restrictions would be unthinkable for a state legislature or the U.S.
Congress whicheven at their most dysfunctionalare obligated to
accomplish some minimal amounts of discrete activity, such as authorizing
budget appropriations. For a private membership organization with
particular shared functional goals, however, the process is appropriate and
effective. In this case, NACHA announced approval of the Same Day
165
The major change had clear and
ACH rule on May 19, 2015.
overwhelming support.
With the ACH payment system, private governance creates private
law on matters of operational concern to the functioning of the system.
The Federal Reserve and other government agencies are such a
necessary and looming presence that one may best describe the ACH
system as a public-private partnership, perhaps analogous to the private
governance of stock exchanges in the midst of public regulation by the
federal Securities and Exchange Commission. The governance and
phenomenal growth of the ACH system is a data point that anyone
seeking a future for public payments law must consider, right alongside
the rise of the card systems. The rise of the ACH system proves that
private operations governance, even when conducted as a public-private
partnership, is able to respond to technological change in a way that a
public law code like the UCC cannot. Nonetheless, the ACH system
shares with the card system a contrasting lesson about the need for public
law, as all consumer ACH transactions are subject to the Electronic
Funds Transfer Act just like their debit card cousins. The lesson here,
again, is that once basic and bright-line end-user protections are in place,
payment system operators will have sufficient incentive to improve and
upgrade the technology and security of their operations, absent a
comprehensive public regulatory scheme. A modest amount of user
protection goes a long way. ACH stands as another compelling example
that the UCC paradigm of a comprehensive regulatory structure has
faded, and the fading has come with little or no ill effect.
C. UCC Comeback? Updating (and Not Updating) the
Payment Articles
The rise and ongoing expansion of card-based and automated
clearing house payment systems would, on first thought, seem to be a
situation ripe for lawmaking by the same uniform laws process that
brought about the Uniform Commercial Code. And indeed, that thought
has been acted upon many times since the original promulgation of UCC
Articles 3 and 4. The high-water mark for ambitious reform of state
payments law was the proposed Uniform New Payments Code (“NPC”)
of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The ultimate demise of the NPC project
165. Same Day ACH RFC Summary, supra note 161.
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in 1985 was the beginning of a new era for the public law of payment
systems: an era of occasional advancessuch as the enactment of Article
4Awas overshadowed by marginalization enabled by the combination
of technology and private contract law. Articles 3 and 4 never actually
lost their places; instead, the real-world activity of payments moved
elsewhere, resulting in the legal cacophony that exists today. This Part
reviews briefly how these events came to pass becauselike the rise of
the payment card and ACH systemsthey reveal lessons for the future
of public payments law.
The Permanent Editorial Board (“PEB”) for the UCC created a
committee in 1974 called the “3-4-8 Committee,” and charged it with
studying and updating the three articles enumerated in its name in light
166
of the impact of electronic systems. Following a comparatively swift and
noncontroversial modernization of Article 8 on investment securities,
attention then turned to the payment articles.
“The New Payments Code project,” recounted Commission
Executive Director Fred Miller shortly after the project’s demise, “began
with the belief that certain technological advances necessitated various
amendments to Uniform Commercial Code articles 3 and 4, which govern
167
commercial paper and bank deposits and collections.” That belief in the
inadequacy of Articles 3 and 4 was widely shared, even in the 1970s when
the technological disconnect was far less pronounced than it is today.
Credit cards and electronic funds transfers were not only becoming more
prominent, but even payments involving checks were affected by
technology and were not well reflected in a UCC principally drafted in
168
the 1940s and 1950s. Though the New Payments Code (“NPC”) would
have diminished the UCC proper by causing the repeal of Article 4 and
169
the removal of checks and drafts from Article 3, it was nonetheless
inspired by the scope and scale of the UCC. The NPC, as project
Reporter Hal S. Scott stated, was “intended to provide a comprehensive
170
legal framework for all types of noncash payments.” Karl Llewellyn
and the original UCC drafters would have felt right at home with this
171
“ambitious” effort to craft an all-encompassing code. The NPC even
166. Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A. A Study in Process and Scope, 42 Ala. L. Rev. 405,
407 (1991). Article 8 on securities law was updated comparatively quickly to account for the uncertificated
securities and other then-recent developments, and it was finally approved by both NCCUSL and the
ALI in 1977. Id.
167. Fred H. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 Bus. Law. 1007, 1007–08 (1986) (describing
the background of the New Payments Code project).
168. Id.
169. See Uniform New Payments Code P.E.B. Draft 3, § 2 (“Applicability of Code”), cmt. 2.
P.E.B. Draft 3 is generally considered to be the most widely-disseminated version of the NPC.
170. Hal S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1664, 1665–66 (1983) (emphasis added).
171. Roland E. Brandel & Anne Geary, Electronic Fund Transfers and the New Payments Code,
37 Bus. Law. 1065, 1074 (1982); see Peter A. Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the True Codification
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172

contemplated displacement of the federal EFTA. “The basic rationale
of the NPC is that the legal rights defined for parties to payment
transactions ought to be as similar for each payment system as is
possible[,]” and that “any dissimilar principles should be based on a clear
technological or other necessity, and not on historic accident or the
173
ability of special interests to wrest concessions.” All types of payments
were accordingly reduced to only two categories, draw orders and pay
orders, with payments in each category treated the same as all other
174
payments within the category. This goal of consistency across payment
systems was a worthy one, and the need to address electronic payments
was undeniable. What went wrong?
The consistency goal turned out to be problematic and at times
“tended to represent a somewhat extreme position,” at least insofar as
175
payment system stakeholders were concerned. Objections to early
drafts, for example, arose from eradication of the holder-in-due-course
176
concept, and the importation from TILA’s credit card provisions of a
177
right of reversibility for all consumer payment orders. By the time of
Permanent Editorial Board Draft No. 3 in 1983, consistency was losing
out to process expediency, with the holder-in-due-course doctrine
178
revived, except as against original consumer drawers. The right of
reversibility was removed from payments by check, and, perhaps more
179
critically, became subject to contractual waiver.
Opposition was churning among interested parties to the plan for a
comprehensive payments code even before completion of the NPC’s first
draft, and some issues raised at the outset continued to plague the NPC
throughout the entire drafting process. What aspects of payment systems
governance, for example, should be left to private contract? A 1978
meeting on the topic in Williamsburg, Virginia had sought input from
“practicing attorneys, law professors, consumer representatives,
representatives of industry, and state and federal regulators of payments

of Payments Law, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 83, 90 (1984) (likewise describing the NPC drafting effort as
“ambitious”).
172. Scott, supra note 170, at 1665–66.
173. Brandel & Geary, supra note 171, at 1074.
174. See Fairfax Leary, Jr. & J. Stephen Pitcairn, The Uniform New Payments Code: The Essential
Identity of “Pay” Orders and “Draw” Orders, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 913–14 (1984) (“The draftsmen
of the proposed UNPC have apparently perceived an important difference between the ‘draw’ order
(basically, a draft, check or other message given a creditor to present to a payor account institution)
and the ‘pay’ order (a payment order presented directly to an account institution by its own
customer).”).
175. Fred H. Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 39 Bus. Law. 1215, 1217 (1984).
176. See infra Part II.C, text accompanying notes 86–99.
177. Miller, supra note 175, at 1217.
178. Id. at 1218.
179. Id.
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180

systems.” Arguments against the NPC included the assertion that “areas
where there was no law could be covered adequately by agreement” and
that “the flexibility afforded by the lack of regulation was, if not necessary,
181
The
at least highly desirable given ongoing system development.”
subsequent success of the payment card and ACH systems suggests not
only that these arguments against the NPC had merit in 1978, but that
these considerations should inform payments policy today, as well.
Another NPC drafting difficulty with resonance in the present day
lay in determining the appropriate role for consumer protection
provisions. The effort to standardize payments law across checks, credit
cards, and electronic fund transfers hadat least initiallyresulted in
the imposition of “consumer protection features” of the federal TILA
182
and EFTA onto the checking system, much to the displeasure of banks.
Five years after the original conference, a second conference was held in
Williamsburg in 1983, and it led to a decision by the 3-4-8 Committee to
reorganize the NPC (existing at that time in PEB Draft No. 3) “along
183
functional lines without the special consumer provisions.”
The decision to delete the consumer-specific protections “was made
primarily because no consensus on the consumer provisions seemed
184
likely.” The Permanent Editorial Board decided that these matters were
“better left to the federal government and the states” outside of the
185
uniform laws drafting process. The revision plan also called for a
substantial reorganization that subdivided draw orders and pay orders
186
into further categories of written, electronic, and prearranged orders.
The removal of consumer protection provisions, however, cost the NPC
the support of consumer interests, while the banking interests who
opposed it initially never came around to support the NPC in a merely
187
functional version. By 1985, the NPC project was no more, and the
188
UCC’s PEB instead turned its attention to less ambitious goals. While
the NPC itself perished, the entire decade-spanning episode still survives

180. Id. at 1217.
181. Id.
182. Rubin, supra note 55, at 557–58 (asserting reasons for the demise of the NPC project).
183. Miller, supra note 175, at 1220.
184. Id.
185. Miller, supra note 167, at 1008.
186. Id. at 1221–22.
187. Rubin, supra note 55, at 557–58; see Alces, supra note 171, at 101–02 (detailing points of
opposition to the NPC raised by the New York Clearing House).
188. Miller, supra note 167, at 1008; see Miller, supra note 166, at 409 (“The attempted ‘fix’ [of the
NPC] was not successful. Even with it, there was little support for the NPC and active opposition
continued. As a result, in mid-1985 the NCCUSL and the ALI terminated the NPC project, and
instead created two new projects to proceed in tandem . . . .”).
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as a data point for those suggesting and criticizing special-interest
189
“capture” of the uniform law drafting process.
Two projects born in the demise of the NPC were much more
successful in achieving promulgation and legislative adoption, but they
ultimately did not stem the fragmentation of public payments law. First,
the drafters created a new Article 4A to govern commercial funds
transfers, particularly wholesale wire transfers, an area that had been
190
largely void of governing law. Commercial funds transfers were notably
also in no need of consumer protection, since consumer transactions
191
subject to the EFTA were excluded from the article. Article 4A was
192
promulgated in 1989. Second, the drafters sought to modernize Articles
3 and 4, so that those parts of the UCC could at least deal with the late
1980’s technology in the check processing system, including the
possibility of “truncating” checksthat is, converting checks to digital
form and facilitating the (once unfathomable) act of destroying the
193
original paper documents. Revised Articles 3 and 4 were promulgated
194
in 1990.
The “strongest legacy” of the defunct NPC was the “exclusion,
consistent with the traditional UCC approach, of affirmative consumer
195
protection” from the three payment articles. Justification for this
approach included the fact that consumer law (both state and federal)
had developed non-uniformly and outside of the UCC, making an
attempt at uniform consumer protection provisions undesirable to
jurisdictions that had both more-protective and less-protective existing
196
policies. Furthermore, consumer protection law cannot be made

189. Janger, supra note 64, at 586–87 (asserting that the New Payments Code illustrates how
“actual capture of the ALI/NCCUSL process is a real concern when a uniform enactment has the
potential to benefit an organized group at the expense of a diffuse and disorganized group.”).
190. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 170, at 1675 (“Unlike contracts in the check system, for example,
which are broadly legitimized by the U.C.C., these private contracts do not operate within any
statutory framework and may be unenforceable on grounds such as adhesion or unconscionability.”).
191. See U.C.C. § 4-108 (West 2014) (stating exclusions from the scope of Article 4A).
192. UCC Article 4A, Funds Transfers (1989) Summary, Nat’l Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%204A%2C%
20Funds%20Transfers%20(1989) (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
193. See generally Id. § 4-406, cmt. 3 (referencing truncation as an alternative to check return or
retention).
194. Bruce A. Campbell, The Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 70 Mich. B.J. 296, 296 (1991) (“In mid-1990, both the ALI and the [Uniform Law Commission]
approved a revised Article 3, with conforming miscellaneous amendments to Articles 1 and 4, for
submission to the states.”).
195. Miller, supra note 166, at 412–13.
196. Id. at 414 (asserting that a uniform payments act addressing consumer protection “would
likely be unacceptable in lieu of established provisions in the states where extensive provisions already
had been negotiated”).
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variable by agreement, and accordingly was inconsistent with the
197
flexibility needed in an infrequently amended code.
Articles 3 and 4 were subject to another set of revisions in 2002, but
these revisions were even more modest than the 1990 rewrite. After
some consideration of harmonizing Articles 3 and 4 with the Federal
Reserve’s Regulation CC, which implements the Expedited Funds
Availability Act, the 2002 amendments ultimately consisted of primarily
198
technical updates. The most robust changes in the amendments
package affectednot payments as suchbut the law of guarantors,
harmonizing the UCC with the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and
199
Guaranty. The project did not go farther, as there was “little interest on
the part of the Federal Reserve Board and the banking industry to
200
redraft Articles 3 and 4 to comport with Regulation CC.” Public
payments law would remain fragmented and increasingly marginalized.
In many observers’ opinions, Articles 3 and 4 now “do little work” in the
201
payments arena.
Despite some important updating of Articles 3 and 4 and with the
addition of Article 4A to cover a category of small-volume but highdollar amount business wire transfers, the UCC today covers largely the
same consumer-payments territory that it did in the 1960schecks as
202
negotiable instruments. This limited coverage in the face of checks
being overtaken by other payment options is certainly not for lack of
effort and vision on the drafters’ side, as reflected in the NPC. The
dominant lesson of the marginalization of the UCC payment articles is
that their scope is difficult to expand, even when circumstances call for
expansion. Payments is an area of rapidly evolving technology, and the
necessarily time-consuming task of drafting, promulgating, and achieving
acceptance of a uniform act is difficult in such a fieldand the difficulty
increases a whole order of magnitude when payments law is wedded to
consumer protection. Despite the sea change in technology, updates to
the UCC payment articles have tended toward minimalism. In the
meantime, the success of debit and credit cards has proven that payment
systems can function quite well without a comprehensive code.
197. Id.
198. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 La. L.
Rev. 1097, 1141–42 (2002) (recounting that in the process leading up to the 2002 revisions, neither the
banking industry nor the Federal Reserve Board expressed interest in redrafting Articles 3 and 4 to
comport with Regulation CC).
199. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-605 cmt. 1 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2014).
200. Rasmussen, supra note 198, at 1142.
201. See, e.g., id.
202. Cf. Daryl B. Robertson, Report of the Commercial Code Committee of the Section of Business
Law of the State Bar of Texas on Revised UCC Articles 3 and 4, 47 Baylor L. Rev. 425, 429 (1995)
(“Revised UCC Article 3 could be regarded as further codification of the common law of negotiable
instruments that began in the United States with the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
promulgated by the Commissioners in 1896.”).
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III. Emerging Payments Technology and Its Legal
Frameworkor Lack Thereof
Law lagging behind societal and technological developments is
203
unsurprising, but in the case of payments law, the lag has not prevented
204
innovation, despite the existence of considerable challenges. Indeed,
the framework of constant innovation is ultimately the norm to which the
law must comply, even more so than the practices of consumers and
businesses. This Part will describe exemplars of two major streams of
innovation, and position them in the current scheme of payments law.
First, the development of mobile payment innovation, exemplified here by
Apple Pay, creating new means of payment through existing financial
channels, frequently stretching their application far beyond their originally
attended arenas. Second, the development of decentralized virtual
currency or “cryptocurrency,” exemplified here by Bitcoin, represents a
complete bypassing of existing financial channels, completely defying most
existing legal frameworks. Both of these instances of emerging payment
practice and technology represent the next types of challenge to the
public law paradigm for payment systems. These challenges must be
accounted for when conceptualizing the future of payments law.
A. Apple Pay and Other Mobile Payments
What exactly are mobile payments? In a March 2015 report, the
Federal Reserve Board’s Division of Consumer and Community Affairs
broadly defined mobile payments as “purchases, bill payments, charitable
donations, payments to another person, or any other payments made using
205
a mobile phone.” The means of access could be by a web page through
the web browser on a mobile device, by sending a text message (“SMS”),
206
or by using a downloadable app on a mobile device. The rapid
development of mobile payments is, unsurprisingly, following in the
wake of developments in smartphone technology.
Major players in the smartphone marketparticularly Apple,
Samsung, and Googleare all seeking to establish dominant positions in
the mobile payments space with their respective payment platforms:
Apple Pay, Samsung Pay, and Android Pay. These platforms do notat
least not yethave market potential as large as their brand acceptance
203. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 73 (1967) (“In popular parlance, this or that aspect of the law is often
said to ‘lag behind the times.’”); Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep
Up with Technological Change, 2007 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 239, 239 (2007) (“It is often stated that
the law lags behind technology.”).
204. See Winn, supra note 120, at 695 (“Novel services are finding it difficult to fulfill the conditions
required to make a modern payment system function in any environment.”).
205. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Consumers and Mobile Financial Services
2015 14 (2015).
206. Id.
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because the platforms work on only more recent devices. For example,
Samsung Pay, which launched at the end of September 2015, is only
compatible with the 2014 Galaxy S6 phone series and subsequent high207
end Samsung devices. Google released Android Pay in mid-September
2015, but it will work only on phones running Android version 4.4 (“Kit
208
Kat”) or higher. Apple Pay similarly requires a 2014 iPhone 6 series or
209
later. Notably, all of the qualifying devices have built-in near-field
communication (“NFC”) capability, which enables a contactless swipe of
210
the phone for point-of-sale payments. Lag in new technology adoption
is thus a challenge for all three of these payment platforms, but the
challenge is one that should diminish over time. Because Apple Pay is
the most established of these three mobile payment platforms, this article
will use Apple Pay as the exemplar of methods and issues typical of
mobile payments in general.
Mobile payment systems tend, unlike the cryptocurrency discussed
below, to be built upon the existing legal framework for electronic
paymentspayment cards and ACH debits. Indeed, the term “digital
wallet” is particularly appropriate for systems like Apple Pay because it
uses the same payment devices that would be located in a physical
211
walletcredit cards and debit cards. Accordingly, the initial hurdle to
user adoption of mobile payments is getting the user to input their
payment card data, an idea that seems risky at first blush. Payment cards
have, from their inception, had to deal with the problem of unauthorized
payments, such as those made using a lost or stolen card.
Unauthorized use can be a particular problem with debit and credit
cards that do not require use of personal identification number (“PIN”)
codes for their use (typical of the MasterCard and Visa networks). Apple
Pay has two principal ways of preventing unauthorized payments. One is
simply to introduce the PIN to what would be PIN-less transactions with

207. Samsung states that its payment product works with Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge+, Samsung
Galaxy Note5, Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge, and the Samsung Galaxy S6, all released in 2014 and later. See
Samsung Pay: Compatibility, Samsung, http://www.samsung.com/us/support/owners/app/samsung-pay
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
208. See Get Started with Android Pay, Google, https://support.google.com/androidpay/answer/
6224811?hl=en (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). The “Kit Kat” version of the Android operating system was
released in October 2013. Id.
209. See Secure, Simple, and Even More Useful, Apple, http://www.apple.com/apple-pay/ (listing
devices that are Apple Pay enabled).
210. Jessica M. Gray, Note, How Apple Pay Coincides with the Consumer Financial Protection Act:
Will Apple Become a Regulated Entity?, 16 J. High Tech. L. 170, 181 (2015) (“Apple Pay’s technology
uses a near field communication (‘NFC’) to allow customers to pay at a checkout counter with
fingerprint authentication.”).
211. See Secure, Simple, and Even More Useful, supra note 209 (describing the usage of Apple’s
Wallet app).
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212

the actual card. While that method adds beneficial security in the event
of the loss or theft of an iPhone, it also adds friction to the payments
process beyond what would occur with a physical payment card. Friction
in the payment process is a substantial concern for card-accepting
213
merchants. Even the long-planned shift from magnetic stripe to EMV
embedded-chip cards has been slower to implement than expected, based
214
in part on merchant fears of losing point-of-sale business. The more
innovative solution in new mobile devices is a fingerprint or other
biometric sensor, which is not only a more secure method for
determining individual authorization, but is also less intrusive in the
payments process than even the use of a plastic payment card.
The key technology in overcoming both actual and perceived risks
of unauthorized mobile paymentsand what stands to make mobile
payments more secure than plastic cardsis the process of tokenization.
When a user makes a payment with Apple Pay, the system does not
transmit the user’s actual credit or debit card numbers. Instead, a unique
“device account number” is assigned, encrypted and securely stored (in the
215
case of Apple Pay) in a “Secure Element” chip built into the hardware.
Every payment then generates a transaction-specific data tokena
216
“dynamic security code.” This token represents one-time authority to
make one specific payment for a specific amount to a specific
217
merchant. Because a particular token will not be used more than once,
the risk exposure from the token being intercepted is minimal. No card
counterfeiting akin to fraudulent “skimming” of the magnetic strip on

212. Id. (allowing for either use of a passcode number or a physical fingerprint for each transaction
using the Wallet app).
213. EMV stands for “Europay, MasterCard, and Visa,” after the originator of the technical
specifications for the chip system. Tracy Kitten, The History of EMW: An EMW Forefather Explains Why
Chip Is the Future, Bank Info Security (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/interviews/
history-emv-i-933 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). Despite the origin of this acronym, EMV chips are now used
across most cards, including American Express and Discover, for example. EMVCO Members, EMVCO,
http://www.emvco.com/about_emvco.aspx?id=156 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
214. See The Consumer ABCs of EMV, PYMNTS.com (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.pymnts.com/indepth/2015/the-consumer-abcs-of-emv/ (advising retailers to understand “common problems that could arise
during the transaction, including potential lag times in card authentication.”).
215. David Narkiewicz, Apple Pay: Beginning of the End of Plastic Credit Cards?, 36 Pa. Law. 60
(2014). Other mobile payment systems do not necessarily store the underlying payments data in
hardware, instead keeping this data in software installed on the mobile device. Id.
216. Press Release, MasterCard, Apple Pay Available to MasterCard Customers in the UK from
Today (July 14, 2015) (on file with author), http://newsroom.mastercard.com/press-releases/apple-payavailable-to-mastercard-customers-in-the-uk-from-today/.
217. See Lydia Segal et al., Credit Card Fraud: A New Perspective on Tackling an Intransigent
Problem, 16 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 743, 766 (2011) (“With tokenization, the substitution of the
credit card number with a string of other numbers called a token, merchants store the token, not the
credit card number or other data on the card’s magnetic stripe. Rather, the payment processor or bank
keeps the credit card number and associated data in a secure server or “vault,” and is able to map
tokens to their corresponding credit card numbers.”).
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the back of a payment card should be possible. Mobile payment
security exceeds that of a plastic card because the end-user does not have
to show an actual credit or debit card, or reveal her name, card number,
219
or security code to the cashier when paying in-store.
A mobile payment transaction reflects innovation that partially
involves existing tried-and-true payment systemsdebit and credit cards.
To the extent mobile payments ride the rails of existing systems, the case
for applying existing lawsuch as TILA and EFTAis strongest. The
new electronic overlay, however, creates some degree of legal
uncertainty. In the case of our Apple Pay example, Apple has complete
control over the entire authorization and tokenization processes. If the
fingerprint reader or the Secure Element chip in an iPhone fails, the
failure comes from Apple hardware, not from the credit card issuing
bank or card network ultimately authorized by the device. If a user’s
Wallet App is hacked so as to allow fraudulent or unauthorized access,
the exploited weakness was in Apple software rather than in any
operations of a merchant’s acquirer bank or in the card network itself.
Past determinations of which party was in the best position to prevent
unauthorized use tended to center around only two parties on the
220
purchaser’s sidethe card issuer and the card user. The mobile system
operator is now unquestionably a third factor in the process, and the
public law of payments generally does not account for this third role.
Google and Samsung are in the same position as Apple in grafting a new
221
payment platform onto existing systems.
Mobile payments represent a significant challenge in reaching
outside the existing contours of the allocations of liability in payments
law for fraud and unauthorized use. That challenge is important for
future public payments law, but the scope of the challenge pales in
comparison to that raised by cryptocurrency.

218. See Adam J. Levitin, Private Disordering? Payment Card Fraud Liability Rules, 5 Brook. J.
Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 1, 9 (2010) (asserting long before the launch of Apple Pay that greater use of
“tokenization and end-to-end encryption” would discourage skimming and other forms of credit card
fraud).
219. Narkiewicz, supra note 215, at 60.
220. See Francis J. Facciolo, Unauthorized Payment Transactions and Who Should Bear the Losses,
83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 605, 607 (2008) (describing traditional payment system risk analysis as
considering who, among “either customers or financial institutions” could take precautions against loss
so as to “place the obligation on the party who can avoid the loss at the lowest cost.”).
221. See, e.g., Press Release, MasterCard, MasterCard Powers Android Pay, Bringing Mobile
Payments to Android Device Owners (May 28, 2015) (on file with author).
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B. Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrency
While Apple Pay and other mobile payment innovations generally
function through existing financial channels, and thus substantially implicate
current law in those systems, so-called “cryptocurrency” is built on a
radically different approach. These virtual currenciesmost prominently
Bitcoinuse technology to bypass existing financial channels, up to and
222
including government central banks like the Federal Reserve. As a
consequence of this rejection of existing financial structures,
cryptocurrencies raise a more diverse set of issues for payments law.
Because Bitcoin represents the most established form of cryptocurrency in
circulation today, this Article will use it as the exemplar for this stream of
payments technology.
Navigating the arena of cryptocurrency requires navigating shifting
terminology. The United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”) defined “virtual currency” as “a medium of exchange that
operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all the
attributes of real currency. In particular, virtual currency does not have
223
legal tender status in any jurisdiction.” In its broadest sense, the term
“virtual currency” could encompass a variety of stores of value, ranging
from physical to digital in form and from centralized to decentralized in
224
control. All virtual currencies exist in contrast to government-issued
fiat currency like the U.S. dollar or the European Union (“EU”) Euro.
As its name implies, “fiat currency” initially derives its value by
225
governmental fiat, a directive that the currency is legal tender within its
226
227
issuing jurisdiction. Fiat currency does not have any intrinsic value

222. See Daniela Sonderegger, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin Needs Just a Bit of
Regulation, 47 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 175, 177 (2015) (observing that Bitcoin has been “[h]ailed the
ultimate alternative to the global banking system” and that it “seeks to separate money from the
state’s regulatory power.”).
223. Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Dep’t of Treasury, Guidance: Application of FinCEN’s
Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies 1 (Mar. 18, 2013);
see Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies and Federal Law, 18 J. Consumer & Com. L. 65, 67 (2014)
(describing the FinCEN guidance).
224. Danton Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution, 89 Ind.
L.J. 441, 442–44 (2014).
225. Or, to quote the ubiquitous statement on the upper-right face of the U.S. one dollar bill (and
elsewhere): “THIS NOTE IS LEGAL TENDER FOR ALL DEBTS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE.”
226. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (West 2016) (providing that U.S. coins and currency, “including
Federal reserve notes” are legal tender “for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.”).
227. At various points in its history, the American dollar was also a “commodity currency” when
the dollar was pegged to a commitment by the United States to buy and sell gold at a fixed price of
dollars per ounce. See Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law 2 (George Wash. Univ. Law
Sch., Working Paper No. 9, 2015). The last abandonment of any vestiges of a gold standard occurred in
1971, when “President Nixon announced that the United States would no longer honor its pledge to
buy and sell gold, not just at thirty-five dollars per ounce but at any price.” Kenneth W. Dam, From
the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 504, 528 (1983); see Peter C. Tucker, Note, The Digital Currency Doppelganger:
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based on the paper on which it is printed or in its digital representation in
a bank account. Rather, the value of fiat currency is ultimately based on
trustfaith in the creditworthiness of the issuing entity.
“Cryptocurrency” here specifically refers to a digital form of virtual
228
currency that is typicallybut not necessarilydecentralized. Bitcoin is
a paradigmatic cryptocurrency in that it is: (1) digital; (2) largely
decentralized; and (3) not backed by the fiat of any government issuer.
Despite the potential nuances in meaning, “virtual currency,” “digital
229
currency,” and “cryptocurrency” are often used as fully synonymous
230
terms, but this Article will use the term cryptocurrency to refer to digital
virtual currencies that utilize cryptography, enabling its use without a
centralized authority governing it.
Bitcoin itself is the brainchild of a programmer (or possibly a group
of programmers) who went under the moniker “Satoshi Nakamoto,” who
231
developed the programming between 2007 and 2009. Nakamoto’s name
is widely considered to be a pseudonym and determining the identity
underlying the name has become something of a parlor game, with
controversy surrounding the claims of Australian tech personality Craig
232
Wright being one of the latest episodes. At least one translation of
“Satoshi Nakamoto” from Japanese to English renders it meaning
233
“thinking clearly outside the foundation.” Programming technology
Regulatory Challenge or Harbinger of the New Economy?, 17 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 589, 623–24
(2009) (“The advantages of gold-backed currency versus fiat currency have been the subject of debate
for centuries.”).
228. Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin
Age, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 271, 278–79 (2015) (“Bitcoin is a type of virtual currency. More specifically,
Bitcoin is a crypto-currency, a form of money that relies on encryption or cryptography (instead of a
central authority such as a national bank or government) to control its creation.”) (internal footnotes
omitted).
229. See, e.g., Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 Hastings
Sci. & Tech. L.J. 159, 160 (2012) (categorizing Bitcoin as “a digital, decentralized, partially anonymous
currency”).
230. See, e.g., Judith Lee et al., Bitcoin Basics: A Primer on Virtual Currencies, 16 Bus. L. Int’l 21,
21 (2015) (“In the past five years, virtual currencies, or ‘cryptocurrencies’ have evolved tremendously
and are quickly establishing themselves as a payment system.”).
231. Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1485, 1488 (2014); see Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008),
www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
232. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, Craig Wright Claims He’s Bitcoin Creator SatoshiExperts Fear
an Epic Scam, Forbes (May 2, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/#10625d5a708f (“We may
never know the true identity of the real Satoshi Nakamoto. Australian academic Craig Wright has
reportedly confirmed himself as the Bitcoin creator, signing messages with cryptographic keys said to
solely belong to Satoshi in private sessions with a handful of media organizations and community
luminaries. But within minutes of Wright’s claims being published, encryption experts have expressed
doubt.”).
233. See Alec Liu, Who Is Satoshi Nakamoto, the Creator of Bitcoin?, Motherboard (May 22, 2013,
10:45 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/who-is-satoshi-nakamoto-the-creator-of-bitcoin; Eric P.
Pacy, Note, Tales from the Cryptocurrency: On Bitcoin, Square Pegs, and Round Holes, 49 New Eng. L.
Rev. 121, 124 n.14 (2014).
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enabling verifiable digital signatures existed well before Bitcoin, and
these already allowed for electronic exchanges of currency, both fiat and
virtual. These exchanges, however, required the participation of a trusted
third-partysuch as a bank or a payment card networkto manage the
transactions. Only a trusted third-party could prevent the “doublespending problem,” which is the ability of a digitally-signing party to
234
spend the same money more than once. Any currency susceptible to
such electronic counterfeiting would inevitably lose its value, just as
widely counterfeited paper currency would lose its value. A merchant is
unlikely to accept someone else’s dollars as value in exchange for goods
if she can readily print her own dollars and keep the goods at the same
time. Electronic payments are not viable if they do not transmit a data
token that either represents scarce currency (as do traditional electronic
payments) or else is itself the scarce currency (as Bitcoins are). Trust in
the third-party controller of an electronic payment system plays an
integral and irreplaceable part in any viable electronic transmission
system for fiat currency.
Bitcoin, in contrast, was revolutionary because its programming
accomplished something never done before: It eliminated the need for a
trusted third-party in a digital currency transaction, and did so in a
manner that, for the moment, has ensured the measured growth and
235
scarcity of the digital commodity. Bitcoin eliminated the trusted thirdparty in favor of a decentralized, peer-to-peer network, and its
infrastructure allows it to be effectively resistant to both first-party fraud
236
and third-party hackers.
The core innovation of Bitcoin enabling decentralized verification
functionality is the “blockchain,” which creates a transaction leger that,
within an acceptably small margin of error, enables the peer-to-peer
network to verify that a transaction transferring Bitcoins is
237
legitimatethat is, not a duplicate. Each Bitcoin transaction requires
authorization by the owner’s private encrypted key, which then creates
an entry on the public encrypted key for the Bitcoin address and creates
a new and unique programming block on the blockchain whose
authenticity is verifiable in the public Bitcoin leger. Crafting a blockchain
of fake transfers that could withstand verification against the public leger
238
would be, for all practical purposes, impossible. If blocks are not
properly linked together in the blockchain, then the distributed software
234. Nakamoto, supra note 231, at 1; see Bayern, supra note 231, at 1489 (“Consider how easy it
would be, relatively speaking, to design an Internet-based currency if the design permitted a party that
everyone trusts to coordinate its operation: the trusted party would issue the digital money according
to generally accepted criteria, verify its authenticity, manage its exchange, and so on.”).
235. Bayern, supra note 231, at 1489.
236. Bryans, supra note 224, at 442–44.
237. Abramowicz, supra note 227, at 15–16.
238. Id.
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will recognize an attempted transaction as a fake. Nakamoto’s system
also provides a mechanism for eventually truncating each blockchain
while maintaining its transactional integrity, thus preventing individual
240
Bitcoins from surpassing functional size parameters. In sum, Bitcoin’s
blockchain structure proved that a trusted third-party was not necessary
for the prevention of duplicate transactions because “decentralized
software could reliably agree upon a single, authoritative sequence of
records so that each potential recipient of funds could know that he or
241
she is the only recipient of those funds.”
While the blockchain technology provides for transactional integrity,
it does not create the relative scarcity and managed growth necessary for a
242
functional money supply. The process of “mining” Bitcoins has, to date,
accomplished both of these goals, while simultaneously creating an
incentive for decentralized Bitcoin users to provide the computing power
necessary for the operation of the public leger system. Mining is the
process by which computers running the Bitcoin software lend their
processing power to the distributed Bitcoin network to perform the
complex cryptographic equations to generate new blockchain blocks to
document Bitcoin transactions in the public register, and to run the
243
register itself. In exchange for this computing work, owners of the
individual computers are eventually compensated with newly-minted
244
Bitcoins. Mining is the only process by which new Bitcoins enter the
system, and the difficulty of the computing function is automatically
adjusted by the Bitcoin software to achieve a predetermined rate of
245
production of Bitcoins to control for inflation. The predetermined rate
239. Id.
240. Nakamoto, supra note 231, at 4 (describing the process for discarding spent transactions to
conserve disk space).
241. Bayern, supra note 231, at 1490.
242. Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 59,
65 (1996) (noting that the “scarcity of money, relative to its demand, fixes its value” and that part of
the Federal Reserve’s charge as to the supply of U.S. dollars is managed growth).
243. Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, BITCOIN: A Primer for Policymakers 7 (2013) (“This
process of mining bitcoins will not continue forever . . . . The arbitrary number chosen to be the cap is
21 million bitcoins.”). At first blush, twenty-one million may seem like a small number for a currency
with transnational aspirations, but Bitcoins can be spent fractionally up to eight decimal places. See id.
(“Miners are projected to painstakingly harvest the last ‘satoshi,’ or 0.00000001 of a bitcoin, in the year
2140.”). Such fractions are necessary for small purchases given that the exchange value of one Bitcoin
(denominated “1 BTC”) has ranged from approximately $200 U.S. dollars to $700 U.S. dollars during
the research and writing of this Article, and Bitcoin has been notoriously volatile at times. See, e.g.,
Bitcoin Price (USD), Coinbase, https://www.coinbase.com/charts?locale=en (last visited Aug. 5, 2016)
(charting the price of Bitcoin from its inception to the present day as against U.S. dollars). In any
event, the ultimate number of separable currency units permitted by Bitcoin is actually
2,100,000,000,000,000or 2.1 quadrillion, certainly a number allowing for more potential widespread
distribution and adoption than a mere twenty-one million units.
244. Id.
245. See Grinberg, supra note 229, at 163–64 (describing the declining rate of issuance of Bitcoins
over time); see also Jonathan B. Turpin, Note, Bitcoin: The Economic Case for a Global, Virtual
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at which new Bitcoins are generated is halved approximately every four
years, and new production will cease once a total of twenty-one million
246
Bitcoins are in circulation, roughly the year 2140. At that point, miners
who support the network will be able to charge transaction fees, albeit
relatively small ones given a larger size of the network and significantly
247
greater computing processor power expected under Moore’s law.
For present technical purposes, one may fairly assume that Bitcoin
works; that is, the technology has a track record since 2008 of doing
precisely what it purports to do. Indeed, the blockchain technology
behind Bitcoin has proven robust enough to attract the interest of
mainstream financial institutions, even if outside of its application as
248
currency. Mainstream commentary has slowly warmed to the concept of
cryptocurrency and the technology it represents. “Bitcoin’s strength[,]”
noted a representative of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, “is
as a decentralized platform that mimics, and improves upon, the
traditional debit-credit leger function of banks. This virtue is notnot yet,
anywaymatched by the other virtues of a truly useful money: as a
249
medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value.”
The proponents of Bitcoin may have revolutionary aspirations, but
Bitcoin as a currency ultimately faces the same problem as any other
nascent payment systemachieving a critical mass of marketplace
250
acceptance. Another lingering difficulty for Bitcoin is volatility in its
251
value reminiscent of distressed fiat currencies. This volatility risk could,
in turn, further hinder prospects for its acceptance. On the flipside,
Currency Operating in an Unexplored Legal Framework, 21 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 335, 341
(2014).
246. See Turpin, supra note 245, at 341.
247. Moore’s Law, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
moore’s%20law (Moore’s law is “an axiom of microprocessor development usually holding that
processing power doubles about every 18 months especially relative to cost or size.”). Moore’s Law is
named after and attributed to Intel Corporation co-founder Gordon E. Moore.
248. Ian Allison, Codename Citicoin: Banking Giant Built Three Internal Blockchains to Test Bitcoin
Technology, Int’l Bus. Times (July 1, 2015, 9:56 AM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/codename-citicoinbanking-giant-built-three-internal-blockchains-test-bitcoin-technology-1508759 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016)
(reporting that Citibank is “talking to governments and regulators . . . [regarding] the potential of either a
blockchain distributed ledger network . . . or even ‘the opportunity to create state-backed digital
currency . . . .’”).
249. Bret Swanson, Bitcoin, Teenage Travel and the Future of Money, Chicago Tribune (July 17,
2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/hub/ct-us-chamber-bitcoin-currency-bsi-hub20150717-story.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
250. See Grinberg, supra note 229, at 175 (observing that Bitcoin is “susceptible to irrational
bubbles and also irrational or rational loss of confidence”).
251. See Jonathan Todd Barker, Why Is Bitcoin's Value So Volatile?, Investopedia (May 27, 2014),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/052014/why-bitcoins-value-so-volatile.asp#ixzz3gO19qg2t
(“Volatility in Bitcoin does not yet have a generally accepted index since cryptocurrency as an asset class
is still in its nascent stages, but with moves in the past year from around $100 to $1,240 at the peak in
December 2013 . . . Bitcoin is capable of volatility in the form of 10x changes in price versus the U.S.
dollar in a relatively short period of time.”).
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volatilityor potential volatilityof fiat currencies may have provided
opportunities for Bitcoin expansion in countries in economic crisis, such
252
as Greece and Argentina. This phenomenon is not confined to basketcase economies, either. Spikes in Bitcoin’s value reflecting uncertainty
over the British pound likewise occurred immediately following the
253
United Kingdom’s vote for a “Brexit” from the European Union.
Regardless of whether Bitcoin itself can achieve acceptance akin to a
widely accepted currency, the existence of cryptocurrency raises a host of
legal questions about its categorization. The IRS has issued a determination
that, for federal tax purposes, virtual currencyincluding Bitcoinis
254
property, rather than currency. A taxpayer who receives payment in
virtual currency must thus include “the fair market value of the virtual
currency” in U.S. dollars on the date of receipt when computing gross
255
income. In short, a sale of goods or services in exchange for Bitcoins is a
barter transaction, at least for American tax purposes. While the IRS
approach is not innately hostile to virtual currency, it could make life
difficult for end-users who, rather than holding Bitcoins as an
investment, actually use it as a currency for daily purchases. Bitcoins
presumably have a tax basis set at their acquisition price in dollars, and
256
produce realized income (or loss) at the time they are spent. Purchases
and sales of securities take place in a setting and with an established
expectation of the need to compute taxable income. But who is equipped
and who reasonably expects to contemplate taxable income every time
she purchases groceries or a cup of coffee? “The bottom line is that there
is not currently an easy mechanism for assessing and collecting taxes on
257
virtual currencies.” But tax laws, like payment systems, are regularly
subject to change.
On another tax front, the European Court of Justice recently
addressed whether transactions involving the buying and selling of
252. See, e.g., Jemima Kelly, REFILEFearing Return to Drachma, Some Greeks Use Bitcoin to
Dodge Capital Controls, Reuters, July 3, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/eurozone-greece-bitcoinidUSL8N0ZG1RZ20150703 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); Elliot Maras, Bitcoin Growth More Than
Doubles in Economically Ravaged Argentina, CCN (July 20, 2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/
bitcoin-growth-doubles-economically-ravaged-argentina/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (suggesting that
Bitcoin has become an attractive alternative to the Argentine peso); see also Editorial Board,
Argentina’s Economic Crisis, Wash. Post (Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
argentinas-economic-crisis/2014/01/30/a35d1818-878f-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html (last visited
Aug. 5, 2016).
253. See Alexandra Mosher, Bitcoin Surges After Brexit Sinks Pound, USA Today (June 24, 2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/06/24/bitcoin-surges-after-brexit-sinks-pound/86340450/
(“The latest gains can be chalked up to a flight to alternative currencies after U.K. voters shocked global
markets by choosing to leave the European Union.”).
254. See Notice 2014–2, IRS (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf (last
visited Aug. 5, 2016).
255. Id.
256. Hill, supra note 223, at 67.
257. Id.
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Bitcoins are subject to value-added tax (“VAT”) in the EU. The
Advocate General of the Court opined that Bitcoin operations should be
exempt from the VAT, strengthening the case, at least in Europe, for
259
treating virtual currency more like fiat currency. Several EU member
260
states that have addressed the issue have reached this same conclusion.
With tax treatment as personal property and a critical mass of
investors who hold Bitcoins seeking profit rather than day-to-day use,
cryptocurrency faces the possibility of being regulated by the Securities
261
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The SEC has thus far avoided
taking a bright line approach, with the SEC Chairman suggesting that
SEC regulation of virtual currency would be “dependent on the
particular facts and circumstances at issue,” noting also that “interests
issued by entities owning virtual currencies or providing returns based on
assets such as virtual currencies likely would be securities and therefore
262
subject to our regulation.” Bitcoin may not be a security inherently, but
the more it is used like one, the more likely it is that the SEC would step in
to regulate it. Meanwhile, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) has decided that Bitcoin and other virtual currencies fall under
the definition of “commodity” such that the sale of put and call options on
cryptocurrency are subject to CFTC regulation under the Commodity
263
Exchange Act.
Despite these fundamental legal uncertainties, cryptocurrencies
have thus far avoided being regulated out of existence. In July 2014, New
York State’s Department of Financial Services proposed substantial
264
regulations impacting virtual currency, adopting its final rules in June

258. Bitcoin Should Be Exempt from VAT-Top EU Court Adviser, Reuters (July 16, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-bitcoin-tax-idUSL5N0ZW3VF20150716 (“Digital currencies like
bitcoin should be exempt from value-added tax (VAT), the legal adviser to the European Union’s
highest court said on Thursday [July 16, 2015], in a case that could set a rule across the bloc.”).
259. Yessi Bello Perez, European Court of Justice Official Proposes Bitcoin VAT Exemption,
CoinDesk (July 16, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/european-court-of-justice-official-proposesbitcoin-vat-exemption/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
260. Id. (listing Sweden, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland as countries not applying the VAT to
Bitcoin transactions); see Chris Grundy, Why the Future of Bitcoin Lies in Europe, CoinDesk (Sept. 6,
2015, 12:22 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/why-the-future-of-bitcoin-lies-in-europe/ (last visited Aug.
5, 2016) (opining that VAT determinations and other aspects of the legal landscape make Europe a
more attractive market for Bitcoin than the United States).
261. Hill, supra note 223, at 68.
262. Letter from Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC to the Honorable Thomas R. Carper, Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Aug. 30, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/VCurrenty111813.pdf; see Hill, supra note 223, at 68.
263. Press Release, CFTC Orders Bitcoin Options Trading Platform and Its CEO to Cease
Illegally Offering Bitcoin Options and to Cease Operating a Facility for Trading or Processing Swaps
Without Registering, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Sept. 17, 2015) (on file with author),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7231-15.
264. Sarah Jane Hughes, Did New York State Just Anoint Virtual Currencies by Proposing to
Regulate Them, or Will Regulation Spoil Them for Some, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 51, 54–55 (2014).
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2015. The rules create a “Bitlicense” required for financial intermediaries
265
who buy and sell virtual currency on an exchange. Notably, these rules
“would not apply to software developers, individual users, customer
loyalty programs and gift cards, currency miners, nor to merchants
266
accepting [Bitcoin] as a payment.” The New York regime thus does not
regulate end-users and merchants any more than they would be
regulated in a cash transaction. While this approach does not endorse
267
cryptocurrency, it certainly avoids end-user inconvenience that could
retard its development as a viable payment system.
Despite the technological viability of Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies, the possibility of them being regulated out of practical
existence as a payment system is quite real over the next several years.
The reason, ironically enough, is that among digital payment systems,
cryptocurrency is the one that most effectively replicates cash. The
features it replicates, however, are those that have traditionally made
cash attractive for criminal transactions and associated money
268
laundering. The passage of value in the payment process is virtually
instantaneous and irreversible. Payment through Bitcoin’s distributed
leger system, while not completely anonymous, is pseudo-anonymous,
not leaving behind the easily traceable digital exhaust accompanying
269
payments processed through the banking system. The most infamous
270
criminal use of Bitcoin to date was the Silk Road digital marketplace.
Until the arrest of Silk Road founder Ross Ulbricht in October 2013, the
site facilitated illegal drug transactions in the shady and less-readily

265. Karen Freifeld & Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, New York Regulator Issues Final Bitcoin Rules,
Reuters (June 3, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/bitcoin-regulation-new-york-idUSL1N0YP1ES
20150603.
266. Id.
267. But see Hughes, supra note 264, at 51 (suggesting that one possible outcome of regulation of
virtual currency could be its legitimization with a broader spectrum of the general public).
268. Nathan M. Crystal, Ethics Watch: Accepting Bitcoin?, SC Lawyer (2014), http://www.
nathancrystal.com/pdf/ethicswatch_0914.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“The cash-like quality of
bitcoins means that they are attractive to criminals who want to hide their activities and identities.”);
Tyler T. Buckner, Rocky Mountain High: The Impact of Federal Guidance to Banks on the Marijuana
Industry, 19 N.C. Banking Inst. 165, 181 (2015) (“All-cash income streams inevitably attract criminal
activity . . . .”).
269. Jason Luu & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Challenge of Bitcoin Pseudo-Anonymity to Computer
Forensics, 52 Crim. L. Bulletin Art. 8, nn.51–52 (winter 2016) (“Many commentators in the public,
media, and policy circles are aware of Bitcoin only from the notorious examples of its misuse by criminals,
notably the two Silk Road prosecutions. These commentators are impressed by the danger arising from
Bitcoin’s pseudo-anonymity, which makes it difficult to track financial transactions.” (internal footnotes
omitted)).
270. Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk
Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 12 (2014) (“Silk Road, described as the ‘Amazon for
Drugs,’ is perhaps the most significant example of a site reported to have been responsible for major
sales . . . .”).

Burge-67.6.docx (Do Not Delete)

August 2016]

9/8/2016 4:35 PM

APPLE PAY, BITCOIN, AND CONSUMERS

1535

271

accessible “dark web” corners of the Internet. The cash-like qualities of
Bitcoin made it the currency of the criminal’s choice on Silk Road. In
May 2015, Ulbricht was sentenced to life in prison, and the Bitcoins
272
seized by federal authorities became subject to civil forfeiture. As of
September 2015, the U.S. Marshals Service was still in the process of
273
auctioning off the Bitcoins.
While the endorsement by criminal elements is not a welcome one,
the existence of such attraction to Bitcoin transactions is considerable
evidence that cryptocurrency has succeeded as a payment system, albeit
one requiring new creativity on the part of law enforcement. The
ultimate story of Silk Road, after all, is one where law enforcement
prevailed over the criminal enterprise.
A generation ago, an assertion that “the essential function” of all
noncash payment systems is “to affect a transfer of deposit institution credit
274
from a debtor to a creditor” was difficult to dispute. Cryptocurrency now
makes the assertion quite disputable by technology that substantially
replicates cash and enables removal of depositary institutions and other
275
“trusted intermediaries” from the payments mix. Mobile payment
systems like Apple Pay are operatingalbeit not always comfortablyon
top of the existing law of payments, but Bitcoin and others in the virtual
currency space have leaped beyond that law. Both streams of
development, however, represent the breadth of the moving challenge
facing the law of payments. Where, if anywhere, is the public better
served by the regulation of payment systems? What should be the source
of that regulation? Is the legal management of payments an appropriate
means to achieve policy goals beyond the mere functioning of the
system? The successes, failures, and developments of the last seventy
years provide some answers to these questions and show that we need
not lament the marginalization of public payments law. Instead, we need
to apply these lessons of the past to identify public law’s role for the
future.

271. Bernice B. Donald & N. Chase Teeples, Not Your Father’s Legal Profession: Technology,
Globalization, Diversity, and the Future of Law Practice in the United States, 44 U. Mem. L. Rev. 645,
653 (2014) (describing the dark web as “an area of the Internet that regular users cannot access
without special software or unique information known only to ‘dark Web’ users”).
272. See Kate Vinton, Silk Road Creator Ross Ulbricht Sentenced to Life In Prison, Forbes (May
29, 2015, 4:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2015/05/29/ulbricht-sentencing-silk-road/
(“In addition to life in prison, Ulbricht also owes the government almost $200 million . . . . The
$183,961,921 accounts for all illegal drug and fake ID sales in Bitcoin on the Silk Road.”).
273. Pete Rizzo, US Marshals: Final Silk Road Bitcoin Auction Likely for 2015, CoinDesk (Sept. 4,
2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/us-marshals-bitcoin-auction-2015/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
274. Leary, Jr. & Pitcairn, supra note 174, at 914 (emphasis added).
275. Nakamoto, supra note 231, at 1–3.
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IV. A Path Forward for Payments Law
Payments law historyright up to its most recent developmentshas
much to teach about systemic competencies for public law and private law
in fields of rapid technological innovation. Areas traditionally thought to
require the treatment of a comprehensive code can have innovation stifled
by such treatment. This Article does not seek to criticize public
regulatory law as such, but it instead calls for recognition of public law’s
limits. “Efforts to create a unified body of law for all payment systems
276
have so far been unsuccessful.” The role of private contract law has
expanded to fill the vacuum. This Article suggests that the lack of
successes in answering past calls for creating unified and comprehensive
277
regulation has, albeit unintentionally, been a good thing for payments.
We know what works, and can accordingly apply the lessons of
experience. The most beneficial paradigm for governance of payment
systems going forward is a division between (1) private law and publicprivate partnerships that handle systemic matters of operation, and (2)
public law focused on protecting payment system end-users from
oppression, fraud, and mistake. Such an allocation of legal responsibilities
is most capable of dealing with a foreseeable future of paymentsa future
that includes unforeseeable innovations. Accordingly, this Part of the
Article explores features of that allocation.
A. The Divide Between Public Law and Private Law
The default mechanism for governing payment systems should be
private contract law, a category that for present purposes includes the
output of public-private partnerships, such as the operating rules of
NACHA. Put differently, public law should presumptively not be the
governing device for payments, although the presumption is a rebuttable
one. Indeed, and as shown below, the private law presumption certainly
is rebutted in some specific instances, particularly regarding end-user
278
protection. Setting aside those exceptions, however, raises the question
of why private law is worthy of such a presumption. Experience provides
three interrelated reasons to err on the side of private governance. First,
private law is more capable of adapting to technological change in a
meaningful timeframe. Second, after bright-line public law protections of
system users are in place, the remaining incentives will be for system
operators to conduct themselves in a manner that produces the most
social benefit. Finally, the parties operating a payment system are in the
276. Rogers, supra note 17, at xiv.
277. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 171, at 89 (arguing at the time of consideration of the New Payments
Code that “only a ‘true code’ . . . will improve payments law. To achieve that goal a payments code must
be comprehensive; that is, it must be pervasive in scope, codifying the general law of payments systems,
paper-based as well as electronic.”).
278. See infra Part IV.B.
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best position to determine allocation of risks unaccounted for by limited
public law, and also to handle a limited collection of risks that public law
should impose.
The first reason for a general preference of private contract law is
that the public legislative or regulatory process is not nimble enough to
keep up with the times. That fact is not a design flaw in deliberative
democracy; it is an intentional feature where the intention dates at least
279
as far back as the U.S. Constitution. Obtaining passage of legislation in
Congress is a difficult proposition in most cases, and speed is a rarity,
particularly in the absence of a national emergency. For even the most
admirable work of the Uniform Law Commission (“Commission”), the
280
enactment goal is multiplied times fifty statesplus U.S. territories. Such
deliberative processes are a benefit and result in greater stakeholder
inclusion. The operational side of payment systems, however, suffers from
the worst in such a process. Beyond the end-user experiences, there is little
public interest apart from the operators in the system.
The complexities of enactment would not be an overwhelming
problem in the one-time or once-a-generation affair that describes much
public legislation. An area of rapid technological advancement, in
contrast, requires frequent updates to micro-level rules of system
operation. That requires returning to the legislative well more often than
is realistically feasible, given the transaction costs. Moreover, these
frequent appeals have diminishing returns concomitant to the
diminishing political interest. MasterCard and Visa can change their
operational rules with considerably less effort. Even an association like
NACHA, with its vast membership and deliberative notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, is capable of turning out rule updates on an annual
basis. Public law cannot compete here. Absent a matter of public
concern, efficiency weighs heavily in favor of private law in a field of
swift technological changes, as is the case with developing electronic
payment systems.
Private law is also presumptively the superior regulatory system
because system operators are, assuming a baseline of general legal
protections against oppression of end-users, naturally incentivized to
conduct themselves in a manner tending toward the most efficient
system. Both the payment card systems and the ACH system suggest this
result based upon decades of growth (at least as to consumers) within
bright-line protective regimes under TILA and the EFTA. Ironically, this
lesson of commercial law history is analogous to Karl Llewellyn’s claim

279. Cf. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
280. See generally About the ULC, Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, http://
uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%the%20ULC (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“The state
uniform law commissioners come together as the Uniform Law Commission for one purposeto
study and review the law of the states to determine which areas of law should be uniform.”).
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about the impact of trade association rules. The leading architect of UCC
regulation claimed that “trade association rules are presumptively
281
efficient when all affected parties participate in creating the rules.”
Llewellyn believed, however, that the limits of the desirability of trade
association self-governance were reached when they dealt with the
unorganized public. At that point, “they engage in exploitation,” and
282
their rules “no longer deserve the presumption of desirability.” Put in
the payment systems context, this concept means that the commercial
actors should be trusted to run their own affairsprovided that the law
prevents the actors from exploiting the public, hence the public law
aspect of this framework described in the next Part.
The third of these interrelated reasons for the presumptive
deference to private contract law is because of the superior information
position held by stakeholders in technologically developing payment
systems. Simply put, the system players are in the best position to know
what works. NACHA and its members, for example, are in the best
position to decide when same-day ACH transactions are financially and
technologically feasible. Credit card network owners, for example, have
the most technical ability to process payments over their networks.
Operating stakeholders in any technologically advanced payment system
have the best knowledge to prevent fraudulent abuses of their system.
Targeted public law need only protect end-users from fraud and mistake
by shifting the risk of loss to the party operating the technology. At that
point, the means of prevention should shift to the operator unless and
until the means are harming the public.
Accepting a presumptive role of private governance of payment
systems, the question arises as to when rebuttal of the presumption is
appropriate. The short-but-unhelpful answer is that the presumption may
be rebutted whenever society benefits by doing so. One longer and more
helpful answer is this: With operational systems issues in the hands of
contract law and private consortia operating in a public-private
partnership, the remaining principal matter of public concern is protection
of the end-users of payment systemsindividuals and small businesses
that do not have the leverage or the expertise to protect themselves from
oppression, fraud, and mistake in the various payment networks. End-user
protection should be the principal focus of public payments law because
that is the area where systemic and market incentives will not, standing
alone, tend to reach the most societally desirable result while facing the
challenge of achieving a critical mass in the payments marketplace.

281. Alan Schwartz, The Still Questionable Role of Private Legislatures, 62 La. L. Rev. 1147, 1151
(2002) (describing Llewellyn’s position).
282. Id.
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The assertion that market forces will retard technological innovations
achieving critical mass in the marketplace sounds counterintuitive, but
history suggests it to be true. Credit card systems existed before they were
subject to the bright-line TILA fifty dollar limit for consumer losses due
to unauthorized use, yet the full flourishing and consumer acceptance of
the credit card payment mechanism did not occur until afterward. Why?
An important part of the answer is the across-the-board fifty dollar loss
limit. It was easy to communicate as an assurance to potential credit card
customers, and the confidence of customers was bolstered by the legally
mandated lack of deviation from the bright-line rule. No single outlier
could generate a persistent stream of unauthorized-use horror stories
that would have the effect of retarding the entire market for adoption of
283
and habitual use of a then-unfamiliar payment system. Credit card
payments became ubiquitous in part because a user-protective legal
environment facilitated their being so. Debit cards and consumer use
markets for ACH payments (like online bill pay) have similarly
benefitted from the user protections of the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act. User protections, rather than operational rules, must be the focus of
public payments law. Indeed, decades of payment systems development
teaches usrather surprisinglythat payment innovators should want
some level of bright-line and user-protective public law because those
protections stimulate marketplace acceptance.
If one accepts, as this Article does, the propriety and advisability of
a division between matters of private concern and matters of public
concern in payments law, a question necessarily arises whether public
law should be enacted at the state or federal level. Given the past
284
accomplishments of the UCC and its drafters, uniform state law would
generally be an attractive option. In fact, as of the time of publication of
this Article, the Commission is in the process of drafting a uniform act
285
governing virtual currency businesses. History suggests, however, that
taking on a role involving user protection will be a formidable challenge.
286
From the New Payments Code project of the 1970s and 1980s to the
287
Article 2 revision project of the 1990s and 2000s, the veto of opponents

283. See Winn, supra note 120, at 709 (“Consumers may migrate toward regulated systems because
they provide these incidental benefits without regard to how well systemic risk issues are managed.”).
284. See generally Stein, supra note 36 (detailing accomplishments in the uniform laws drafting
process over the preceding 120 years).
285. See Frederick H. Miller & Sarah Jane Hughes, Final Study Committee on Alternative
and Mobile Payment Systems Report 1–2 (2014) (recommending expedited development of a
uniform act regulating certain aspects of virtual currencies).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 150–183.
287. See generally William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 Duq. Bus. L.J.
131 (2009) (exploring the problems likely to arise as a result of amended Article 2); Fred H. Miller,
What Can We Learn from the Failed 2003–2005 Amendments to UCC Article 2?, 52 S. Tex. L. Rev. 471
(2011) (discussing the failure of UCC Article 2 amendments).
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of protective legislation has been consistently effective. The UCC
revision process in particular can be the graveyard where consumer
protection initiatives go to die, and that challenge would have to be
overcome to enact appropriate protective legislation. The idea of
establishing consumer protective legislation through the UCC payment
articles has even been called a “fantasy” for academics arising from (pun
288
thoroughly intended) “substance abuse.” The current effort by the
Commission does not involve the UCC, however. Moreover, players in
the nascent realm of cryptocurrencies in particular have incentive to
289
support some level of user protection legislation. Protection creates an
environment for widespread market acceptance, as the credit card
industry can attest.
Moreover, an additional incentive exists for savvy players in the
payments industry to be amenable to action by the Commission and
proposals like the Conference of State Bank Supervisors’ (“CSBS”)
Model Regulatory Framework for Virtual Currency Activities, discussed
below. The alternative to uniform state law is far-reachingand perhaps
overreachingregulation by the federal Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”). The CFPB has suggested that it is poised to act in the
290
area of emerging payment systems. The technology and financial
sectors might have an incentive to work out bright-line protections for
payment end-users from oppression, fraud, and mistake, unlike in the
1970s and 1980s. The incentives to participating in the process are thus
both positive and negative. The positive incentive is to create a legal
environment that facilitates broad market acceptance of new payment
technologies; the negative incentive is to avoid innovation-retarding
over-regulation.
With this public-private dividing line in mind, and having set forth
reasons why public protection law for payment systems users could be
more successful now than in the past, we turn to application. How would
we evaluate regulatory proposals in light of the public-private divide?
This Subpart of the Article will use proposals from the federal CFPB and
from the CSBS to illustrate. Numerous other proposals are out there, to
be sure, including individual state legislation and the Commission’s
pending virtual currency project. The two evaluated here are sufficiently
representative for present purposes: The CFPB effort implicates federal
288. Norman I. Silber, Substance Abuse at UCC Drafting Sessions, 75 Wash. U. L. Q. 225, 239 (1997)
(describing this outcome as “the most preposterous” of three improbable UCC-drafting fantasies).
289. See, e.g., Peter Van Valkenburgh & Jerry Brito, State Digital Currency Principles and
Framework: Version 1.3 4 (2015) (acknowledging that trusted digital currency intermediaries “so long as
they walk and quack like a money transmitting duck, offer the same case for regulation as traditional
financial services” but that such regulations should not retard innovation).
290. See generally Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Protection Principles: CFPB’s
Vision of Consumer Protection in New Faster Payment Systems (2015) (describing new CFPB
protection principles in light of new payment systems).
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law and the mobile payments strand of innovation along with other
payments built on existing system rails; the CSBS framework, in contrast,
specifically implicates state law and the cryptocurrency strand of
innovation.
B. Applying the Divide: The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau
The federal CFPB was created under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, and
as its name suggests, the agency is focused on protection of consumers
specifically, rather than payment systems users more broadly, such as
small businesses. Coinciding with the eve of implementation of same-day
ACH payments, the CFPB released “CFPB’s Vision of Consumer
Protection in New Faster Payment Systems,” a list of nine “Principles”
291
for future system development. The CFPB’s aspirational “vision” does
not have the force of law, nor does it seek to micromanage or displace
the private players in banking. The CFPB is “not specifying” how the
Principles “must be achieved,” but instead recognizes “that a variety of
system components, including system architecture, operator covenants
and warranties, requirements for participants and intermediaries, rules,
and other mechanisms” are a critical part of “providing consumer
292
protection, utility, and value.” The Principles do, however, represent a
potential path for federal regulation of payments.
The Principles do not precisely coincide with the categories of
oppression, fraud, and mistake advocated in this Article, but many of the
293
Principles fit within them. In brief paraphrase, the CFPB Principles are:
(1) Consumer Control over Payments. Payment consumers should
have clear control over when, how, and under what terms the
consumer has authorized a payment.
(2) Data and Privacy. Consumers should be informed how their data
are being transferred and used, and systems should prevent misuse of
the data.
(3) Fraud and Error Resolution Protections. Payment systems should
protect consumers against mistaken, fraudulent, and unauthorized, or
294
otherwise erroneous transactions.
(4) Transparency. Payment systems should be transparent to
consumers, including disclosure of costs, risks, funds availability, and
security of payments; and should also include real-time access to the
status of transactions.

291. Id.
292. Id.
293. The bold titles in this list are the exact titles used by the CFPB. For brevity’s sake, the text following
each title is the Author’s paraphrase of the CFPB’s description of each applicable principle.
294. Under this third item, the CFPB cites Regulation E (electronic fund transfers) and Regulation
Z (credit card payments) as examples of “appropriate safeguards” now existing. See Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau, supra note 290.
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(5) Cost. Payment systems should be affordable, using fee structures
that do not obscure the full cost of making a payment.
(6) Access. Payment systems should be broadly accessible to
consumers and widely accepted by businesses and other consumers.
(7) Funds Availability. Faster payment systems should promote faster
guaranteed access to funds by consumers, not only to financial
institutions and merchants.
(8) Security and Payment Credential Value. Payment systems should
include strong security and a limitation on the value of consumer
payment credentials, minimizing the worth of such credentials to
fraudsters.
(9) Strong Accountability Mechanisms that Effectively Curtail System
Misuse. The mechanisms of any faster payment system should
collectively incentivize operators, participants, and end-users against
295
misuse of the system.

The CFPB Principles provide a useful framework for further
discussion of the best role for public law in future governance of payment
systems, regardless of whether the CFPB is the appropriate agency to
handle such matters. Because this Article calls for a robust, but tightly
limited protective regime for end-users, the CFPB Principles are a good
vehicle for evaluating protection goals that, given the agency mandate,
will tend to err on the side of more regulation. For present purposes, the
CFPB Principles fall generally into three categories: (1) those where
protective regulation is inadvisable or unnecessary due to existing market
incentives; (2) those where protective regulation is arguably useful due to
conflicting market incentives; and (3) those where protective regulation
should be a priority because of the clear public benefit of legally protecting
users from oppression, fraud, and mistake.
The first category of Principles are those where regulation is either
unnecessary or ill-advised. Items six, eight, and nine above (high access,
credential security, and accountability against misuse) are outcomes that,
at least in centralized private payment networks, are likely adequately
protected by the impact of market forces on the private sector. On these
points, federal regulation is not only unnecessary, but would lag painfully
behind fast-developing technology. A payment mechanism with limited
market access or that has poor security and is susceptible to in-thesystem misuse would ultimately not survive in the face of a viable market
alternative. In the case of cryptocurrency, these classes of protections are
actually off-point, just as they would be for payment in cash itself. The
intended cash-usability of Bitcoin and the like are a feature of its design.
The second category is a mixed bag, raising issues that could be
appropriate for public law protection, but are not necessarily so absent
evidence of end-user protection through a given payment system. Items

295. See id.
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two and seven (data privacy and faster funds availability) face both
encouragement and discouragement incentives in the private market.
While some end-users will be drawn to, and place a premium on,
personal privacy and expedited funds availability, payment system
providers have financial incentives to mine and repackage user data for
296
sale and to gain float time off aggregated withheld funds. Both enduser privacy and faster funds availability are significant concerns and
raise the potential for abuses, but they are also matters where consumer
choice should ultimately prevail over the risks of abuse. In particular, the
privacy of customer data has become a selling point for both merchants
297
and payment providers. Though not centrally marketed, Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrency do tend to be touted as an alternative for their
transactional privacya quality which has been of public concern to law
298
enforcement. For all developing payment systems, items two and seven
on the CFPB list are thus potential points of regulation, but are now
better left alone as the market may solve these problems most
effectively. If that does not happen, public law regulation looms nearby.
The core matters of end-user protection where public law protecting
the end-user is called for is under items one, three, four, and five, dealing
respectively with unauthorized payments, fraudulent or erroneous
payments, and, taking four and five together, clear disclosure of system
costs and user-relevant operations (such as funds availability). These are
areas where, despite the regulatory cost, payment systems innovation
would be encouraged by bright-line protective legislation that fosters
confidence in emerging payment systems. The goal here is to facilitate
duplication of the successes of the payments card industry under TILA
and EFTA. Such legislation could come at the state level, but the
CFPBand the risk of over-regulationstands waiting in the wings if it
does not.

296. See generally Steve Kroft, The Data Brokers: Selling Your Personal Information, CBS News
60 Minutes (Aug. 24, 2014) (describing the resale value of personal information); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 237,
247 (1992) (describing how holders of payment funds “enjoy the benefit of the float between the time
the instrument is issued and the time of payment”).
297. See, e.g., Jeremy Kahn, Amazon’s Pitch to Europe: Your Data Is Safe from American Spies,
Bloomberg Bus., Jan. 6, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-07/amazon-s-pitch-toeurope-your-data-is-safe-from-american-spies; Apple’s Commitment to Your Privacy, Apple, http://
www.apple.com/privacy/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“At Apple, your trust means everything to us. That’s
why we respect your privacy and protect it with strong encryption, plus strict policies that govern how all
data is handled.”).
298. See, e.g., Evan Perez, Holder: Bitcoin Raises Law Enforcement Concerns, CNN Money (Apr.
8, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/08/technology/bitcoin-holder/ (last visited Aug. 5,
2016) (describing Congressional testimony by then-Attorney General, Eric Holder, about Justice
Department concerns with “bad actors who use digital currencies to buy drugs, weapons, and other
illegal goods and services.”).

Burge-67.6.docx (Do Not Delete)

1544

9/8/2016 4:35 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1493

C. Applying the Divide: The Conference of State Bank Supervisors
At the state level, a significant effort to guide regulatory efforts
regarding licensure and supervision of activities in the cryptocurrency
stream of payments innovationunder the name of “virtual currency” in
this instancehas come from the CSBS. The CSBS is a nationwide
organization of financial regulators from all fifty states and certain U.S.
299
territories dating back to 1902. The stated mission of the CSBS is to
support state regulators “in advancing the system of state financial
supervision by ensuring safety, soundness and consumer protection;
promoting economic growth; and fostering innovative, responsive
300
supervision.” Coming from a state regulator perspective, the CSBS
formed an Emerging Payments Task Force “to identify areas for
consistent regulatory approaches among the states” with regard to
301
developing payment systems. The task force concluded that “activities
involving third party control of virtual currency, including for the
purposes of transmitting, exchanging, holding, or otherwise controlling
302
virtual currency” should be regulated at the state level. The eventual
product arising from this conclusion is a Model Regulatory Framework
303
released by the CSBS on September 15, 2015 (“CSBS Framework”).
The Frameworkunsurprisingly, given its sourcefocuses on payment
intermediaries in many areas associated with the safety-and-soundness
304
and anti-money laundering regulation of banks. As this Article is
focused on the governance of payment systems as such, its review of the
CSBS Framework will be restricted accordingly, with one exception.
The banking-style focus of the CSBS Framework is noteworthy
because it is representative of the state law responses to Bitcoin. The
Framework is less interested in the operation of cryptocurrencies as
payment systems than it is in the licensure of intermediaries “involved in
305
third party control of virtual currency.” The same can also be said of
the finalized New York “Bitlicense” regulations and, as of this writing, of
the pending Uniform Law Commission project to regulate virtual

299. See About the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Conference of State Bank Supervisors,
https://www.csbs.org/about/what/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
300. Id.
301. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, State Regulatory Requirements for Virtual
Currency Activities: CSBS Model Regulatory Framework 1 (2015).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., id. at 12–13 (including “Licensing Requirements,” “Financial Strength and Stability,”
and “Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering” regulation as components of the CSBS Framework).
While these are certainly important topics, they are beyond the payments-focus of this Article, just as
general banking regulation was beyond the scope of earlier discussions of checks and credit cards.
305. Id. at 11.
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306

currency businesses. This Article asserts that decades of payments law
experience shows that a comprehensive code would not be a productive
approach for governance of an emerging payment system. The CSBS
Framework is, in that regard, consistent with this Article.
The “Consumer Protection” branch of the CSBS Framework,
however, is heavy on information gathering while light on specific
protections that facilitated success of the credit and debit card systems.
The Framework recommends, in outline form:
(1)Required consumer protection of policies and documentation of
such policies;
(2) Holding an actual amount of virtual currency in trust for customers
and ensuring that amount is identifiable separately from any other
customer or virtual currency business entity holdings;
(3) Required policies and documentation of complaints and error
resolution;
(4) Required receipt to consumers with disclosures regarding exchange
rates;
(5) Required disclosures to consumers about risks that are particular to
virtual currency;
(6) Required disclosure of virtual currency insurance coverage, which
at a minimum includes notice that virtual currency is not insured or
otherwise guaranteed against loss by any government agency; and
(7) Public disclosure of licensing information and agency contact
307
information.

Consumer protection items in the Framework are generally divisible
into two categories: documentation and disclosure. As for documentation,
items (1) and (3) in the Framework encourage states to mandate that
regulated virtual currency businesses keep consumer protection policies,
including policies on the critical payment systems issue of error resolution.
They do not, however, specify any scope of the policies, but merely that
they be reduced to “documentation.” Item (2) suggests the need for bankaccount-like records that separately identify virtual currency that is “held”
for customers. This requirement, while well-intentioned, is problematic in
its inconsistency with the actual technology used in the transmittal of
value represented by virtual currency. Bitcoin policy advocates Peter
Van Valkenburgh and Jerry Brito have explained this disconnect
between concepts of traditional money and its newer digital cousin:

306. See generally Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Project Description for the
Regulation of Virtual Currencies Act: Drafting Committee Meeting (Oct. 9–11, 2015) (describing the
scope of the Commission drafting project and providing additional resources).
307. Conference of State Bank Supervisors, supra note 301, at 13.
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Digital or “virtual” currency is not, by definition, something that is
capable of being held in the literal sense. Moreover, while we talk of
“storing” digital files, perhaps in a cloud service like Dropbox, we
cannot talk of storing Bitcoins. Bitcoins are not files; they are
assignments of value made to pseudonymous addresses and listed on a
public ledger called the blockchain. No one holds or stores bitcoins;
one holds or stores the cryptographic keys that grants one permission
on the network to sign for transactions involving particular addresses.
To the extent anyone ever holds or stores, or simply has bitcoins, it will
308
be because they have control over these cryptographic keys.

In any event, when a regulated non-owner of Bitcoins has the
309
capability of spending them unilaterally, the protection contemplated in
item (2) may need to be framed around the generation of monthly account
statements, akin to those associated with checking and credit card
310
accounts. Item (4) addresses both documentation and disclosure, with
the documentation being the required issuance of a “receipt” (which could
be digital) for a cryptocurrency transmission between an intermediary and
its customer.
The heavy reliance on disclosures contained in items (4) through (7)
is of concern. This is because excessive disclosure risks are overwhelming
and thus ineffective, with the disclosure costs not outweighed by measurable
311
benefits. The result truly could be, in the words of Omri Ben-Shahar and
312
Carl Schneider, “more than you wanted to know.” The category of “risks
that are particular to virtual currency” seems particularly vague and overinclusive. Some disclosureslike the fact that virtual currency businesses
offer no protection analogous to that provided by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation for bank accountscould nonetheless be made as
313
easily digestible oneliners. The CSBS Framework has already been
criticized for vagueness that could cover unintended parties and hinder
314
innovation in the cryptocurrency arena.

308. Van Valkenburgh & Brito, supra note 289, at 6 n.21.
309. Id. at 7 (advocating the characteristic of unilateral control over digital currency transmission
as the appropriate trigger for consumer protection legislation).
310. See U.C.C. § 4-406 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2015) (allocating bank and customer
responsibilities for fraud and error monitoring where the bank issues a statement of account to its
customer).
311. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Financial Disclosure Regulation, 43 J. Legal Stud. S253 (2014) (asserting that consumer disclosure
laws do not deliver their anticipated benefits).
312. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure
of Mandated Disclosure (2014) (describing and documenting supporting research on the
ineffectiveness of excessive mandated disclosure).
313. Jeremy Papp, A Medium of Exchange for an Internet Age: How to Regulate Bitcoin for the
Growth of E-Commerce, 15 U. Pitt. J. Tech. L. Pol’y 33, 39 (2014) (observing that Bitcoin exchanges
create “a credit risk similar to depositing money into a bank account, only without the government
protection of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).”).
314. See, e.g., Peter Van Valkenburgh, Freshly Unveiled CSBS Model Regs: Good Goals, Poor
Execution, Coin Center (Sept. 15, 2015), https://coincenter.org/2015/09/freshly-unveiled-csbs-model-regs-
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Of particular interest here is what the CSBS Framework does not
contain. The CFPB Principles point in a direction that too readily
exceeds bright-line protection of system users against oppression, fraud,
and mistake. The CSBS Framework, in contrast, is too amorphous and
hesitant, focused on disclosure and documentation. The end-users of
emerging payment systems would benefit from a middle ground. The
system proponents would as well. That, if anything, is the legal lesson
from the success of credit cards and debit cards. That lesson speaks to
payments law going forward.
Experience with public law governing older payment systems also
aids in identifying what aspects belong in the future of payments and
what should fade. Consumer use of the ACH system is subject to the
EFTA and Regulation E, but those protections should be extended to all
users. Such a bright-line rule is not prevented by “any inherent
315
technological limitation on the ACH system.” An example of existing
end-user protection that is outside the framework proposed here is the
ability to withhold payment on a credit card. That should not be
replicated as it is not a protection against problems in the payments
system. Regulating payments is not an appropriate way to shift (on an
inconsistent basis, no less) the balance of power between merchants and
their consumers. Legal protections in payment systems should relate to
the payment process, not the underlying transaction.
Experience with technological development further suggests rules
from the checking system that ought not to be duplicated in the future.
316
Technology, coinciding with the Expedited Funds Availability Act, has
made payment “float”a delay in the actual debit of a payment that is
most frequently associated with checkssomething that should not be
treated as a right. Another aspect of the checking process that should fall
by the wayside in an era of faster payments is the stop payment right,
which is inconsistent with technology that replicates the expediency of
cash.
Taken as a whole, our decades of experience with the decline of the
checking system and the rise of other systems should inform our
payments policy decisions. Both the CFPB approach and the CSBS
approach have some merit, but neitherfrom the standpoint of
payments governancehits the sweet spot. Protecting users outside of
the payment system from oppression, fraud, and mistakeall of which
can occur inside the payment systemis an important public law

good-goals-poor-execution/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (“Who needs to be licensed? Who should state
regulators worry about? None of this is made any clearer by the work unveiled by the CSBS today,
andindeedthe suggestion that mere facilitation of transmission gives rise to an obligation to
license only muddies these already cloudy waters.”).
315. Hal S. Scott, The Importance of the Retail Payment System 36 (2014).
316. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001–10 (West 2012).
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function. Most other operational concerns are appropriately left to
private contract law. At a minimum, private law deserves the
presumption of primacy for system operations until clear circumstances
show otherwise.
Conclusion
A code, as Robert Scott has defined it, is “a preemptive, systematic,
and comprehensive enactment of a whole field of law” that, by design,
317
“purports to give the answers to all relevant questions” in its field.
Decades of experience suggest that a public law code, whether at the
state or federal level, is not a desirable mechanism for governing the
operational side of payment systems in an era of rapidly advancing
technology. The field of payments needs legal protections for end-users
against oppression, fraud, and mistake. It does not need a comprehensive
code. Indeed, to the extent that our existing codes in UCC Articles 3 and
4 are intended to facilitate payment transaction processes, we could
318
easily live without them. Present developments certainly do not call for
replicating them.
Payment card networks and the ACH systems have, by their
massive marketplace successes, shown the potential of largely private law
governance atop targeted public-protective law. Two major strands of
current innovation in payments represent different challenges for legal
structures of payment systems. The Apple Pay exemplar of mobile
payments illustrates the problems of integration of a new payment
system into a pre-existing public law framework. The Bitcoin exemplar
of cryptocurrency shows the establishment of a system that completely
bypasses the previously unavoidable role of the banking system as the
trusted intermediary for noncash payments. The overarching challenge
under these circumstances is to define the most socially beneficial roles
to assign to public law and private law, respectively.
The public law of payments is best limited to the prevention of
oppression, fraud, and mistake victimizing system end-users, yet public
law should be robust in those arenas. Beyond protection of end-users,
private contract law has proven itself to be a superior method of
governance in payment card and ACH transactions. This facilitation of
private ordering should aid development of non-fiat currencies, as well.
The need to address constantly evolving technology requires an
approach where matters of minimal public concern can be dealt with
through private law, while public law can govern with respect to matters

317. Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common
Law and Code Methodologies, in The Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law
171 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
318. Rasmussen, supra note 198, at 1146 (“We could easily live without Articles 3 and 4.”).
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of public concernprotecting the public from oppression, fraud, and
mistake. This framework maximizes the benefits of private lawmaking in
its area of strongest institutional competence, while assigning to public
law the task of protection of end-users who have comparatively little
protective and bargaining power.
Centuries of noncash systems of payment are, in a sense,
approaching full circle. The inland bill of exchange that Lord Mansfield
held to be negotiable was a creature of private ordering, not government
design. The English Bills of Exchange Act, the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law, and ultimately UCC Articles 3 and 4 were all a result
of decisions to take a private practice and subject it to comprehensive
public law regulation. That era is coming to a close in the law of
payments. Future payments law will, as befitting its origins, best be
primarily the result of private ordering, with bright-line public law
protections for end-users preventing the rougher edges of earlier eras.
We are by no means doomed to repeat the history of payments law, but
we would do well to take heed of its lessons in this age of emerging
payments.
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